

Better to Receive Than to Give?

New Perspectives on Trust and God

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Preambles

I am glad to be with you today, grateful to the Marquette Wade Chair Committee and to the Department of Philosophy, its chair John Jones, its Assistant to the Chair Beth Sullivan, its Administrative Secretary Lula Hopkins, and especially to Father Roland Teske for enabling me to serve Marquette in the Wade Chair this concluding academic year. It has been a privilege and a fine opportunity. I thank also my students, of last semester and this, for prodding me to think more deeply about trust.

I'm told that Father Wade was a signal teacher and scholar. The most vivid picture several gave of him comes from the occasion when in the classroom he was stricken and fell to the floor. Retrieving his focus as others scurried to summon help, he resumed his teaching--still stretched out on the floor. I promise to stay relatively upright and close to this lectern, lest you feel the need to summon Public Safety if I change my position too drastically. Of course, in discussion after I finish, I may change my position, but I'd hope not too drastically--and of course only for good reason.

My Focus and My Project

If you happened to read the announcement paragraph for this lecture, you found this. “Philosophers of religion usually ask more about arguments for the existence of God than about good relationships to God. Even if the key relationship is trust, is trust in God like human trust? What can we learn from reflection on human political and personal living: from confidence surveys, disability and vulnerability, the desire for self-sufficiency, the need for help? Should we qualify both the judgment of Aristotle that largesse is best and the teaching of Jesus that it is more blessed to give than to receive?”

This talk distills a few points from a larger project, a book on trust and theism, which, thanks to Marquette’s generosity, I am close to finishing. By the way, if you want the text of this lecture, Google me, including my middle initial “J”, and my homepage will offer you a link to the lecture’s text.

In thinking about trust, I do not start by thinking that trust is always a virtue, and then define other dispositions to be “not really trust.” Furthermore, suspicion can be a virtue. But in my remarks this afternoon I am not going to survey the equally important landscapes of skepticism and suspicion.

Jesus: It is Better to Give than to Receive

My title’s question arises in response to a judgment of Jesus and an observation of Aristotle. In the Acts of the Apostles we find the report of a saying of Jesus: "keep in mind the words of the Lord Jesus who himself said, 'It is more blessed to give than to receive'" (NAB Acts 20:35). My title proposes tilting the comparative the other way.

Like the Air We Breathe

In so many areas of our life, we trust others and we are trusted by others. We pay no attention to these relationships until they are called into question. Like the air we breathe, we pay attention to the quality of our trusting only when we suspect that our trust is not so salubrious. As we travel our highways, a few feet away from us tons of traffic rush; we pass one another with inches to spare every day. We trust other drivers to avoid plowing into us. We think of highway medians when we have reason to be suspicious of others' desires and skills.

Faith, Trust, and Analogy

When it comes to religion, I will be speaking about trust in relation to God. You may be more familiar with the term "faith" in speaking of relation to God. I mean "faith" and "trust" to be more or less equivalent: to have faith in God is to trust God or to trust in God. The New Testament's Greek term *pistis*, usually translated by "faith", I am taking as "trust". And, beyond a religious context, we have near synonyms: confidence, reliance, credit counting on, entrusting. Drawing on the Latin "*fides*", we have the legal and commercial adjective for trust in the term "fiduciary", and we have the general adjective "fiducial".

We are engaged in an exercise in analogy today, in seeing what similarities may obtain between ways of trusting human beings and ways of trusting God. The type of analogy is not simply analogy of language or analogy of concepts, not essentially an analogy of being, but rather more centrally analogy of attitude and behavior--analogy of recommendation, if you will. Our aim is to see, in the matter of trust, what it would be to "Go and do likewise."

Delicacy

There is some delicacy to my speaking about trust in relation to God. I take my cue from a letter to a newspaper advice columnist. A Betrayed Wife writes about trusting her husband. She asks "Should I keep him?" The Advisor says: "If you love him and plan to stay with him,

then sooner or later you're going to have to trust him.” Then she advises about how to trust him.¹ Imagine the boldness of anyone advising about trusting one’s spouse! Imagine even greater boldness of anyone advising about trusting God!

Level of Discourse

If we imagine any such boldness in terms of levels, there is high-level bold advice, where one may formulate principles so general as to be pretty much useless. We should trust God: OK. But why and how? On the other hand, we live our lives at ground level, and when close to the ground where each of us walks, we need to be tactful in giving advice to each other. I offer something between high-level and ground level, and I do so in dialogue with some recent thought about trust, specifically from political science, disability and vulnerability reflections, the desire for self-sufficiency, and the need for help.

How This is Philosophy of Religion

How is what I am doing philosophy, some may ask. This lecture is an exercise in applied philosophy of religion, like an exercise in applied ethics. I understand philosophy of religion to take religion as it is, and ask questions about religion. Some ask questions as insiders: they are religiously committed, and their questions are not hypothetical questions. Some, as outsiders, ask hypothetical questions: *If I wished to trust God, how might I do that?* Recognizing that for many the matter is not hypothetical, I nevertheless pursue the hypothetical question: How might a person trust God? However, the standard contrast between hypothetical and categorical statements should not substitute for the substantial difference between considering hypothetical statements and committing to trusting relationships.

I. Trust is More Than Having an Opinion

I have five points to address. My first point focuses on the difference between beliefs or opinions, and relationships. There are those who maintain that to trust is to have an opinion.

Trust shows up as opinion in consumer confidence surveys, in government confidence surveys, in social science understandings of trust, and even--by contrast--in the New Testament.

Consumer, Government, and Social Science Trust

Consider the monthly Consumer Confidence Survey. People are interviewed over the phone: Is this a good time or a bad time economically? Is this a good time or a bad time to make a major purchase? They are not asked: Did you purchase, did you invest? The interviewees give their opinions. From their opinions are derived reports on consumer confidence. People are indicating whether they believe there is enough evidence to take some risks. They are not asked whether they do take risks. (With actual sales of "durable goods," we have a sign of actual risk-taking.)

Or consider confidence in government. A newspaper last year had the headline "In Government We Trust (As Far as We Can Throw It)." The story had the observation that in some cases there is greater trust of one's government representative than of one's government; in other cases there is greater trust in the system of government and less in specific government officials. The people gave their opinions. Their opinions about the trustworthiness of the government were reported as trust in government.²

Social scientists generally distinguish between trusting and acting on trust. To trust a person is to believe certain things about a person. Trusting is a psychological state, distinct from trustful actions and the taking of risks. A typical social science definition of trust is this: to trust is to believe that someone else has interests which extend to include my own interests; thus to trust is to believe that someone is trustworthy.³

Demons' Beliefs about God

There is a curious biblical echo to such beliefs about another. As the New Testament's Letter of James (2:19) has it, even the demons believe *that* God exists. Demons could even believe-that God is trustworthy. But, being, as demons, opposed to God, they just would not

actually trust God. They could have the opinion that God is trustworthy; they would not, however, act on that belief.

Trust Is More Than Opinion

This opinion approach seeks out answers to questions: What do I think people will do? What expectations do I have? What do I believe about other people's competence? What do I believe about other people's good will? Do I therefore believe that other people are trustworthy?

What is missing in this understanding of trust? Trusting is defined in terms of what I believe about other people. Trusting is not defined in terms of how I interact with other people. But we need to recognize that there is here a difference between thinking and doing, between thinking someone is trustworthy and doing some actually trusting. We know the difference with a bicycle or a parachute, between believing I can ride a bike and actually riding a bike, between believing my parachute will work and actually using the parachute. To trust a parachute is more than to believe it is reliable. To trust a parachute is, actually, to jump. I can believe someone is trustworthy and yet, for various reasons, not actually trust that person. Sometimes, for example, I just decide to take care of the matter myself.

Curiously, if believing is just an opinion I have about someone else, I can never actually be betrayed. I can merely have a mistaken judgment. When I have not actually entrusted anything to a person, the person could not have betrayed me; I just fooled myself. I may scream "How could you betray me?" Actually I just misjudged you. The mistake was mine. Now that I realize I made a mistake about you, I blame you for my incautious mistaken opinion.

My approach, however, focuses on behavior and action and engagement. Trusting is a matter of what I do, not just what I say; it is behavior, not just belief. To trust is not merely to believe something. In actual trusting, there is commitment and engagement.

More needs to be said about how trusting is a way of acting, of course, but before we turn to definition, let us examine my second point, about vulnerability and dependence.

II. Vulnerability, Dependence, and Independence

We would like to be independent. We would like to be invulnerable. Vulnerability is big in recent moral philosophy, because it names the characteristic of those who are endowed with less power in power-differential relationships. While there is a form of ethics that presumes that people are, in relationships involving power and freedom and knowledge, thoroughly equal, there is another form of ethics which pays special attention to relationships where people are different in their freedoms, their power, their knowledge. For those in the latter categories--the poor, women, the marginalized, the ignorant, the mentally or physically handicapped--the term "vulnerable" labels the way in which they can be wounded or harmed when someone else has more freedom, more power, more knowledge.

Some define trust as accepted vulnerability.⁴ There is a good insight here, for when we trust someone we typically feel and find ourselves dependent on another for our well-being but also open to being harmed. We are stretched out and we lie within the causal reach of someone else. If that someone wants to harm us, he or she now can. Maybe it is because of what we choose to reveal, maybe it is because of what we choose to ask help for, but in any case we are vulnerable when we trust.

We could therefore consider trust as something second best. Best is to be independent; best is to be invulnerable. But we are not; so we use trust as a crutch, to help us get along in our lives and world when we would much rather not be dependent. Trust is a crutch when we'd just as soon be moving on our own two feet. Instead, we find ourselves depending on others when we'd rather be independent.

Those who are in any way poor are vulnerable. Dependent on others for what they need, they can not only be actively harmed, but also harmed by neglect, by broken promises, by being

isolated, by being unsupported, deceived, left in the dark. While those who are rich in resources have the option of choosing to be dependent on others, for convenience or gain, people who are poor do not have such choices. The rich can buy reliability. The poor depend on the good will of others.

But the emphasis on vulnerability masks the key component of trust, and that is help. The ability to be harmed or wounded does its own word: vulnerability. But the ability to be helped does not have a word: shall we try “help-ability”?

Vulnerability and Dependence

While some thinkers have positioned vulnerability at the heart of the trusting relationship, it is important to distinguish between vulnerability and dependence. To be able to be harmed is bad. Dependence, on the other hand, is not automatically bad. Dependence is neutral. Well, we might say, dependence may not be ipso facto bad, but dependence does have a bad name. It is *independence* that is automatically good. We declare independence; we admit dependence.

There is a word that captures the independence we would like to have. That term is autarky--with “a-r-k-y”, not with “a-r-c-h-y”; its core meaning is self-sufficiency. (Autarchy, on the other hand, means self-governing, although in some dictionaries the usages of these two etymologically different words largely overlap.) When I am autarkic, I have the possessions, I have the power, I have the relationships that enable me to be all that I can be. When I am dependent, I need others. My dependence can be accepted in various ways: hopefully, fearfully, grudgingly. Instead of defining trust as including accepted vulnerability, I propose that trusting include accepted dependence.

Independence and Disability, with Aristotle and MacIntyre

In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle pictures an ideal human being, one Aristotle calls a great soul or great-minded person, a person of superior spirit, a person who is magnanimous. This person, as Aristotle puts it, “is ashamed to receive benefits, because it is a mark of a superior to confer benefits, of an inferior to receive them” (*NE* 1124b 9-10). So if we are to live up to being a person of great soul, we should be ready to benefit others, and reluctant to receive benefits. The big-hearted person lives with largesse; she or he gives, but is embarrassed to receive.

Philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre has taken issue with Aristotle about giving as preferable to receiving.⁵ He has done so in the context of reflecting on vulnerability and disability. He invites us to consider how we are all, each and every one of us, lacking in abilities. We are all therefore disabled in some ways. In a university setting, it is easy to understand ourselves as having less intellectual or artistic or athletic talent than other people around us. To that degree, we are without an ability we would like to have. If we are to do some things, therefore, we need others to help us do them. If we are to have, we must receive.

But this is still to have our limits be unfortunate, our dependence regrettable, our inabilities a sadness. Trusting then is a coping mechanism, an adaptive mechanism, getting ourselves within the reach of others to enable us to reach what is beyond us. Trusting is second best. Trusting is still a crutch.

The Stoic program and the Reduction of Vulnerability: Independence Without Engagement

Stoic philosophy has a program for reducing suffering by increasing independence and reducing vulnerability. We get hurt because we have our happiness in the hands of others. And we *can* be hurt, at the hands of others. The sensible response to this danger is to reduce our exposure to harm from others. It is better to stick with what we ourselves can control. We

cannot control what happens to us; we can control our own attitudes towards what happens. So we take responsibility for our responses to what happens to us. How we feel about the world or about ourselves should not depend on what others think and do. What is external to me can wound me only if I enable it to do so. So I should keep my real goods internal.⁶

Since trust involves having something good for us subject to what others think and do, it is better to reduce our trust, for in reducing our trust we reduce our vulnerability and increase the likelihood that our desires will be satisfied. If we trim our desires to extend not farther than our range of control, we can make our happiness happen. Since we cannot control what others think of us, we give up caring what others think of us. We reduce the extent to which our welfare depends on the good will and competence of others.

This is the Stoic program: avoid near occasions of trust. Don't look for help and you won't get hurt. The Stoic program can affect our relationships with others. The Stoic program can infect our trust in God. More about this latter later.

So Is It Better To Be Independent?

It seems that self-sufficiency, then, is the ideal. Better to have your own car, your own TV, your own computer, your own money, and be minimally dependent on others. To play on the title of Tony Kushner's "Angels in America," we think that the best plot is to be "Autarks in America." Of course it's OK to *choose* to become dependent. We do that all the time when we sign a contract to exchange goods and services. Interestingly, a contract is a combination of trust and suspicion, when even trust is prudently adversarial. Even if there is cost to us, we enter into that dependence *freely*. It's OK to pay for goods and services rather than rely on ourselves for them--if that's what we choose to do.

I myself observe that there is nothing wrong in itself with being self sufficient. The problem is becoming addicted to being self-sufficient.

III. Definition, of, and Four Dimensions of, Trust

I begin my third point, the project of defining trust, taking special account of vulnerability and dependence, and of receiving beyond believing. (Definitions of trust are myriad, and some definitions, while crafted for a good purpose, wind up explicitly or implicitly precluding, for example, trust in God or a child's trust of parents.) We start with identifying four components for a definition of trust. First, the doing of trusting requires that I have something within the reach of someone else, that I have some good within the causal range of another. So trusting includes having something actually subject to being affected by another. Second, there is consent to my having something within some other's reach. Third, there is a desire--desire that someone take care of what is valuable to me. So, trusting also includes letting someone take care. Fourth, there is a twofold belief or judgment about who or what I trust. I at least implicitly believe that this someone has the ability to take care--the competence--and I at least implicitly believe that this someone has good will towards me--the willingness to take care. So trusting includes the dual belief about another's competence and good will towards me. So there is the aspect of causal range, the aspect of consent, the aspect of desire to be positively affected, and the dual belief that the other can and will be of help.

And if we are looking to chart *good* trust and not just trust, there are the issues of how wide and deep the causal range, how firm the consent--and how broad the discretion accorded the one we trust--how strong the desire, how well-founded the beliefs. The Stoic program would keep trust closely trimmed, and philosopher John Locke also would recommend keeping reliance on a short leash.

These aspects fan out over four dimensions, as I proceed as Aristotle did in deciding that causality needed to be understood in not just a single but in a fourfold way--his material, formal, efficient, final causes.

A first dimension: Sometimes what I have in the care of another is some *thing*, which, however important to me, is quite distinct from my very self. I trust someone with something: I

let someone take care of my furnace, for example. I trust you with this matter, because of your skill and good will. A second dimension: But sometimes what I have in the care of another is my very self: *I*, and not just some thing I have, am in another's hands. And sometimes when I am myself in another's hands, I am content to be so because of that other. I trust you with me because of you. This form of personal trust seems to be in a dimension different from my letting someone take care of some thing.

A third dimension: Sometimes I am trusting not so much for some definite outcome, but for basic support. I have a basic trust or confidence in what I need to uphold me. This is the trust identified as basic by psychologist Erik Erikson. And a fourth dimension: sometimes I am trusting as I seek to learn. I am open: I, as it were, trust my abilities to come to know, as I count on some realities to get through to me if I am open to what they can reveal about themselves.

So, if we want labels, we have trusting as reaching into four dimensions--first, as reliance trust, second, as intimate or I-thou trust, third, as security trust, and fourth, as openness trust. These four dimensions, however, have a common core, and it is this: to trust is to be receptive to enhancement. Receptivity to enhancement is the positive element contrasting with vulnerability to diminishment. Receptivity to enhancement is broad enough to encompass receiving a helping hand, welcoming a personal presence, finding a sustaining ground, obtaining a cognitive insight. I use "enhancement" for whatever may be beneficial, be it instrumental help or personal presence or undergirding security or open enlightenment or illumination.

The differing four dimensions permit seeing some problems associated with trusting badly--such as expecting someone to do something precisely as I want it--to be matters of misconstruing which dimension of trust is the relevant dimension. For example, my close friend is not my reliable factotum.

IV. *How It is Better to Receive Than to Give*

My fourth point has to do with the merits of receiving. While trust is receptivity to enhancement, and such receptivity may be accompanied by vulnerability, it does take us to be

dependent, and requires for plausibility an understanding of human existence as not only inescapably dependent but peacefully so. Trust need not be a second-best option. We can see how trust is of prime importance for human flourishing through a remark by the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel, linking trusting with loving and expecting: “To love anybody is to expect something from him, something which can neither be defined nor foreseen; it is at the same time in some way to make it possible for him to fulfill this expectation. Yes, paradoxical as it may seem, to expect is in some way to give: but the opposite is none the less true; no longer to expect is to strike with sterility the being from whom no more is expected, it is then in some way to deprive or take from him in advance what is surely a certain possibility of inventing or creating.”⁷ Putting Marcel’s remark in other words, we can say: when we trust someone, we enable that person to invent and create. When we trust, we let another create. And we are created.

V. How Better to Trust God by Receiving

Finally, I turn to our fifth and final theme, How better to trust God by receiving. Here I skate on thin ice, as philosophers do when they make suggestions in an area where moral and ascetical and mystical theologians earn their living, not to mention where the saints do their living. We should be cautious because, while as Thomas Aquinas observed there should be no limit to trust in God, yet it is a more serious sin to trust God badly than to trust ourselves badly.⁸

The Difficulty of Trusting God

But it is not easy to trust God. Sometimes it is easier to quote someone else than to speak in one’s own voice about trusting God; and so I quote. In his *Addiction and Grace*, psychiatrist Gerald May observes: “Little in our normal life” he writes, “supports really trusting God. . . . Few if any of us are able to follow Jesus’ call for trust completely. . . . Instead, we assume that trust in God should be only a spiritual ideal, wistfully and distantly respected, but impossible to apply in the down-to-earth conduct of our daily lives. True spiritual freedom, we maintain, is

something that we can consider *after* we have established our physical and relational security in the world. In our culture, the three gods we do trust for security are possessions, power, and human relationships. To a greater or lesser extent, all of us worship this false Trinity.”⁹ I myself regularly remark to my students that the Ten Commandments do not forbid atheism--at least not explicitly. They do forbid idolatry--worship of false gods, bowing down to what human beings have made up. There is a trust equivalent to idolatry, and that is trusting something other than God. Yet despite being thus cautioned about fiducial idolatry, and paraphrasing Saint Augustine, we back down and pray: Give me trust in you, Lord, but not yet.

Recommendations

But, still, from what we have seen, we do have some suggestions to make. We recall that such recommendations are an exercise in analogy of behavior.

First, like trust directed towards people, to trust God is more than having an opinion about God. The survey procedures of the social sciences do not tell us whether people trust God, since actually to trust is more than to have an opinion or belief about God. There is the crucial difference between trust as thinking and trusting as doing.

Second, as with trust directed towards people, there is the crucial difference between vulnerability and dependence. Theologian and saint may agree that we are not, finally, vulnerable in relation to God, however much we may depend on God. But if trust is a matter that goes beyond being subject to harm and is, at its core, receptivity to enhancement, we need to plug in here a convincing philosophical and theological anthropology. We need to be careful not to take self-sufficiency as our ideal. A declaration of appropriate *dependence* is not treason.

Third, there is the significant and scary and salutary difference between trust directed towards people and trust in God. With trust directed towards God there is the challenge of unbounded range, maximal permission, unlimited discretion--with, however, no abdicating our own responsibility for how we live our lives. With God there is no declaration of delegation.

Fourth, we encounter heady theological waters, where one thinks that letting God take care *enables* God to exercise care--and where, conversely, God does well to trust people, because in hoarding care to Himself he leaves people uncreated and uncreative. People's own narratives of their own dealings with God may here shed more light on trusting in and being trusted by God than does a theology of an unchanging God. But we may be encouraged regarding God what Jean Vanier wrote regarding people who are mentally handicapped: "To love someone is to reveal to them their capacities for life, the light that is shining in them."¹⁰

Vulnerability and Dependence in Relation to God

As we have seen, at the core of trust is dependence, but not automatically vulnerability. To trust is to accept dependence. Just as we do in human trusting, we afford someone access to our goods and our lives. We give someone permission to affect us. Or we, as it were, push some aspect of our good out there to get it within reach of someone who can help. We let someone take care, or we ask someone to take care. We choose to depend.

Yet some of this depending, as we saw, is not a matter of choice. Scooped up and taken to a hospital emergency room, we suddenly are within the causal range of others. If we are conscious, we consent to our being helped by them; we sign a consent form. Children, also, find themselves within the causal range of others. Children depend on others for help, for love, for support, for learning. Cranky children may fight such dependence. They will not ask, they will not permit. They shrink back.

Awkward as it may be at times, we are presented with the role of being children of God. Not of being teenagers of God; not of being brothers and sisters of God, but children of God. While you may find the idea of being a child of God irritating or exculpatory, as I have, it does have this insightful implication: we find ourselves within the range of God. We do not choose and then put ourselves within God's causal reach. We may take this dependence hopefully, fearfully,

grudgingly, naïvely. But God asks permission for access to us. God invites us to ask before we would receive. This is a standard philosophical or theological understanding of petitionary prayer.¹¹ In the case of trust, to ask is to grant discretionary access.

But with God, the desire to be affected is maximum, the permission is maximum, God's discretion is maximum, while the responsibility remains one's own, maximum.

Trust in God sometimes tangles with or claims to require with trust in Church. Here the Protestant principle of final allegiance to nothing short of God balances the Catholic principle that what is of God is available to us through human channels. I need not advise you that trust in Church is a very large topic, well beyond what we are up for in this lecture. But suffice it to say this much: that any good suspicion must take its stand on a platform of trust. Political scientists work out rules for trusting and suspecting in society; it would be quite worthwhile to work out rules for trusting and suspecting in the Church.

With you I have taken a look, first, at a social-science reduction of trusting to opinion, and second, at a culturally understandable hankering for independence and self-sufficiency, together with a sensitivity to differences in power that make trusting people vulnerable. Trust is more than believing something about another, more than having an opinion about trustworthiness. To trust is to engage, not to "opine." Third, I propose distinguishing four dimensions of trust, as instrumental reliance, intimate relation, undergirding security, and cognitive openness; such distinctions help nuance responses to questions about whether trusting God unconditionally asks God to be my gofer. Fourth, taking trust as basically receptivity to enhancement suggests, with the appropriate anthropology, that trust enhances human living rather than merely covers for human deficits. Fifth and finally, in not just having beliefs and opinions about God but in dealing with God (while dependent but not necessarily vulnerable), it is better to be ready to receive than judge that giving is all. I would hope Aristotle might adjust and Jesus might agree.

1. Amy Dickinson, "Ask Amy: Should She Act on Her Suspicions?" *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 5 January 2004, E2.
2. Sam Roberts, "In Government We Trust (As Far as We Can Throw It)," *The New York Times*, 4 January 2004, Week in Review, 4.
3. See, for example, Russell Hardin, *Trust and Trustworthiness*, Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust, IV (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), and the review included in J. Keith Murnighan, Deepak Malhotra, and J. Mark Weber, "Paradoxes of Trust: Empirical and Theoretical Departures from a Traditional Model," in *Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Dilemmas and Approaches*, ed. Roderick Moreland Kramer and Karen S. Cook, The Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust, Vol. 7 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004), 293–326, at 297.
4. See Annette C. Baier, "Trust and Anti-Trust," in *Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics* (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: Harvard University Press, 1994), 95–129, and responses to this essay, originally published in *Ethics* in 1986.
5. Alasdair C. MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues*, The Paul Carus Lectures 1997 (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1999).
6. For recent proposals in the Stoic tradition, see Thomas V. Morris, *The Stoic Art of Living: Inner Resilience and Outer Results* (Chicago: Open Court, 2004), and Steven Luper, *Invulnerability: On Securing Happiness* (Chicago: Open Court, 1996).
7. Gabriel Marcel, "Sketch of a Phenomenology and a Metaphysic of Hope," in *Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope*, 1944, trans. Emma Craufurd (New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1962), 49–50.
8. *Summa theologiae* II-II 21,1, Reply 1.
9. Gerald G. May, M.D., *Addiction and Grace* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988), 32.
10. Jean Vanier, "Love and Revelation," *Magnificat* 6, no. 3 (May 2004): 137.
11. Cf. Eleonore Stump, "Petitionary Prayer," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 16, no. 2 (1979): 81–91; reprinted in various anthologies of philosophy of religion.

