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The Hayes History Journal 2020

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The Hayes History Journal is a student publication of the Department of History, Saint Joseph's University, Philadelphia. The Journal welcomes submissions from students at Saint Joseph's University for its next issue. Please contact the Department of History for information regarding submissions or any editorial matters.

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Letter from the Editor

Dear Readers,

In depth research into the past allows us to achieve a deeper understanding of events, people, or time period. We can also learn to gain new perspectives on how to deal with the problems of today. Throughout 2020, Saint Joseph's students all throughout campus researched and analyzed history. Some took the extra step to present a research paper and share it with our readers. These range from looking into the mythology of the classics age to the modern history of Russia that has led to the current day political situation. All of the papers selected for this journal went through a careful editing process, where students put in extra work in order to be accepted for this journal.

Three of our papers investigate tragedies of the 20th century and whether or not they constitute genocides. This includes Lauren Applebee's *Kosovo: A Region Plagued with Tension*, which takes an in-depth look at the devastating aftermath of the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Megan Gentleman's *The Genocide in Bangladesh 1971*, which investigates how the West Pakistani forces treated the Bengali in East Pakistan, and Sophia Wooden's *Nazi's Plan for Slavs in Belarus*, that looks at the genocidal plans the Nazi's had for Belarusian.

Three of our next papers look at the complicated issues of war. In *Ottoman Military Capabilities in World War I*, Patrick du Bois de Vroylande investigated the weakness of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century. In *What Goes Up Must Come Down: The Erosion of Print Media Coverage on the Occupation of Alcatraz*, Michael Maloney looks at how the media reacted to the military occupation of Alcatraz. Lastly, in *Comparison of Medieval Just War Theories*, Gavin O'Connor explains the way the Church justified war in Medieval Europe.

Our next category, politics, deals with two different situations of political change. In *Putin's Illiberal Solution to his Nationalist Battles*, Erin Fenzel examines why Vladimir Putin adopted illiberal policies in order to stay in power. And in *The Fight for Fair Labor*, Noah Pingul looked at the successes and failures of the Fair Labor Act of 1938.

The last section deals in Classics. In this section, Jessie Melvin looks into the work of Phidias to show the cyclical nature of Greek mythological art. This paper is titled, *The Cyclical Nature of Ancestral Karma: A Juxtaposition of the Phidias' Statues of Athena Parthenos in the Periclean Parthenon of Athens, and of Zeus at The Temple of Zeus in Olympia*.

We hope that you enjoy reading these papers and feel inspired to learn more about these topics. There is never an end to studying history and we encourage you to continue the journey. We hope these essays challenge you, entertain you and express the relevance of history in our lives.

Sincerely,

Sophia Wooden

Senior Editor of the Hayes Historical Journal

and the rest of the editing staff

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Section I

Genocide

“Kosovo: A Region Plagued with Tension”

Lauren Appleby

Kosovo, a nation troubled with decades-long mistreatment, provides an empirical illustration of the importance of scrutinizing the international court system. The events that took place in Kosovo over a specific ten-year span and the subsequent reactions from international actors highlight the faults of the institutions in place and subsequently challenges the common definition and interpretation of *genocide* as it undermines the widely accepted ideal of justice.

The year is 1998 and brutality has swept the nation. Forced expulsion, the intentional destruction of communities, rape, and mass murder became the unfortunate reality for the Kosovar people. Following the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, no community had felt the same impact as Serbian province, Kosovo, during its fight for independence. The uneasiness of Kosovo's autonomy from Serbia sparked tensions between the neighboring communities; eventually turning into one of the most brutal events in history. This portion of Kosovo's history is often referred to as an ethnic cleansing, "a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic group or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas". However, the acts committed in Kosovo in 1998 went far beyond that ("United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect."). The atrocities that were committed should not be downplayed to a term that does not accurately depict what happened. By presenting historical information including instances of human rights abuses, flaws in international law, and longstanding history of tension, the succeeding pages will serve as evidence to the facts of existence in Kosovo from May of 1998 to the removal of Serbian troops in June 1999.

Yugoslavia, consisting of modern-day nations including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Serbia, fell in 1991 when Slovenia and Croatia first declared their independence. Located at the southern end of former Yugoslavia, Kosovo, a province of Serbia, felt that the members of that community were ethnically different from that of the Serbian people. Kosovo, consisting of a 95% Albanian Muslim population, has been a point of controversy regarding whether or not it should be recognized as its entity for quite some time. In fact, before the outside intervention, Kosovo and Serbia were in a stalemate as, "Kosovo will accept nothing short of independence, while Serb politicians say Kosovo can be nothing more than autonomous, but not independent" (Grgić and Borut et.).

As a developing nation within such a larger context of other world powers surrounding them, the Kosovar had no choice but to accept the lack of autonomy and oppression forced upon them by the former Yugoslavia and Serbia itself for quite some time. However, with Slovenia and Croatia paving the forefront to cut all ties with their oppressors, Kosovo subsequently attempted to gain independence. In 1992, Kosovo unofficially elected its first "president," Ibrahim Rugova, who did not get much recognition from Serbia as it still controlled Kosovo as a province. In the years following, ethnic tensions and the desire for the Kosovar to have their independent state only grew stronger and led to the creation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1996. Although not a unified military organization, the KLA consisted of over 5,000 Albanians and also had support from Muslim militants from surrounding countries. Given its quick growth and its international support from Albania, Serbian officials were uneasy with the guerilla. The conflict between the two quickly broke out, and by the beginning of 1998 open conflict became regular. This ultimately led to the start of Serbia's campaign of ethnic cleansing that included imposing terror on ordinary citizens, ransacking communities, and a demoralizing number of massacres among many other human rights abuses.

Given the devastation that Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Serbia, and his forces brought upon the Muslim Kosovar, it gained great international attention. Not to mention the genocide that occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 that prompted the former Yugoslavic region to be a focal point for the Human Rights Watch. Furthermore, considering the region's high risk of genocide and exposure to instability, Kosovo subsequently caught the attention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as they offered airstrikes in attempts to end the persecution of the Kosovar.

NATO's intervention lasted a total of 78 days and was a crucial factor in Slobodan Milosevic's decision to remove Serbian troops and bring about an end to the Kosovo War on June 11, 1999. Considering that the Kosovo War and consequent genocide had attracted so much attention and subsequent intervention as it had been under the Human Rights Watch, it is nearly impossible to identify exactly what other arbitration methods would have been needed to prevent the genocide altogether. However, understanding that Bosnia and Herzegovina, another majority Muslim, former Yugoslavic state, just two years earlier suffered from a very similar situation, it may have been less likely to happen in Kosovo if intervention occurred earlier. The United Nations Security Council has the power to decide when, where and what type of peacekeeping mission will occur. A precautionary measure that could have been taken was even an observation peacekeeping mission that could have given outside nations a better understanding of the internal unrest in Kosovo, thus bringing more attention to the situation before the extermination phase began. Making the public, on a global scale, aware of situations often encourages foreign involvement that could potentially deter oppressive governments from committing atrocities knowing that other global powers in opposition of themselves are prepared to intervene.

The war crimes committed in Kosovo beginning in 1998, including the willful killing of the Kosovar, extensive destruction, and intent to cause suffering completely violates one's, "right to life, liberty and the security of person," as recognized in Article III of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights (“Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”). The events that occurred in Kosovo, led by Slobodan Milosevic and his troops, were a deliberate breach of the declaration, and an unnecessary disturbance of peace among these nations. Understanding that everyone has the right to a set of moral guarantees, independent from race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, etc., "provides the basis for all truly rational systems of justice," with any opposition to said rights, being ethically and morally impermissible (Fagan).

As laid out by international law, the guidelines of rational wartime conduct were entirely disregarded and the Serbian troops who committed these atrocities in Kosovo must be held accountable. Nonetheless, to hold people accountable and seek justice for the victims, international recognition is a necessity. Unfortunately, it is rather common for oppressors to commit such heinous acts and later deny the event in its entirety. They do so by destroying any evidence, refusing to address the events and acting as if it never happened, punishing those who speak of it, and even leaving it out of historical books so that future generations will not be made aware of it either. The best way to punish the perpetrators of such actions, as laid out in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, is for them to, "be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed" (Totten). However, it is oftentimes difficult to pinpoint all members of the persecuting group because there are typically so many that punishing everyone would be far too much. Therefore, if high officials have not fled the country, they are often the ones who are tried. Many go unnoticed in reality and are not held accountable for their actions.

In terms of the Kosovo genocide, justice for the victims has been far too disappointing. As of today, the only intentional actions taken to reestablish the respect and dignity of the Kosovar that was so brutally ripped away has been the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The tribunal held Slobodan Milosevic and a handful of other Serbian officials guilty of, "murder, persecution, and deportation in Kosovo between January 1 and late May 1999," but

not genocide (“Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo.”). However, when the trials encompassed all Yugoslav Wars, specifically with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milosevic was then charged with crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. Understanding this raises the question of what constitutes genocide and why the genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered one, while the Kosovo Genocide has been long disputed.

Genocide, as coined by a Polish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin in 1944, are acts including murder, causing serious bodily or mental harm, bringing about physical destruction, imposing measures that prevent births or forcibly transferring children, "committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" (Totten). With consideration to this definition and understanding the extent of the atrocities in Kosovo, the factor that scholars' question is whether or not there was "*intent*". Following the breakup of former Yugoslavia and given the dispute between the classification of the actions of the Serbians, the term "ethnic cleansing" is coined. Ethnic cleansing, unlike genocide, has not been recognized as a crime under international law. Thus, justice has not been achieved to the extent that those victims deserve and will not be until the atrocities are defined by what truly happened.

Despite the controversy, Slobodan Milosevic expressed clear intent to wipe out the entire Kosovar population because of their desire to pursue independence. This becomes evident through the actions leading up to their ultimate plan of extermination. As aforementioned, in 1995, the Serbian government carried out similar atrocities on the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, two other majority Muslim countries. Understanding the history of Serbian oppression serves particular importance because the religious makeup of Bosnia and Herzegovina citizens are similar to that of the Kosovar, whereas, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Macedonia are Christian majority populations, just like Serbia. Thus, reiterating that the identities of each of the states, in particular religious affiliation, proves to be a point of contention. This distinction is significant because when the Christian majority states began their campaign for independence, their transition was fairly easy.

Their transition was effortless in large part due to their lack of contention from other political opponents and oppressors. However, when the Muslim majority states attempted to do the same, it sparked mass extermination of their population. The contrast within the Serbian responses to Muslim states seeking independence, as opposed to Christian states doing the same, proves that there was intent to systematically diminish the Muslim population in this region while simultaneously advocating for the conversion to Christianity.

From suffering under the oppressive Yugoslavic government to seeking its independence to being persecuted by serious violations of international humanitarian law, Kosovo's history is nothing short of intense. From 1998 to 1999, Kosovo experienced the systematic removal of the ethnic Albanian Muslim population within its country in which unfortunately escalated to the genocide of over somewhere between 13,000 and 15,000 people. Although it has been long disputed, the preceding pages outline the historical and political context and serve as evidence in support of the criminalization of Slobodan Milosevic and his Serbian troops on the account of genocide during the Kosovo War. The inability to adequately prosecute War criminals on an international level serves as a limitation to the court system and challenges the effectiveness of the institution as a whole. Looking forward, to make sure that history does not repeat itself, there must be a higher standard of accountability placed on said war criminals with the pressure to indict them coming from both a domestic and international standpoint.

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b.

The Genocide in Bangladesh 1971

Megan Gentleman

In 1971, tensions led to a genocide of the Bengali in East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh as an independent nation. The nearly 8 months of civil war between West and East Pakistan were finally resolved by the Indian military defeating the West Pakistan forces. Over the course of the genocide, war crimes were committed by both forces. Additionally, the genocide can also be defined as ethnic cleansing pursued against the Bengali. This genocide could have been prevented by actions of the United States and Britain specifically, but there were many signs that could have been recognized by the international community.

When the British left India, they decided to create a single Muslim state. However, they created a state that had two territories that did not touch. West and East Pakistan were separated by thousands of miles of India. People joked that only Islam, English, and Pakistan International Airlines kept Pakistan together. The established government was based in West Pakistan where people spoke many languages. East Pakistan was dominated by Bengali speakers and mostly Muslims with a Hindu minority. Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan began to grow due to feelings that their ethnic traditions were unwelcome and they were worse off economically. East Pakistan had 75 million people while West Pakistan had 61 million people, which meant the demand for greater representation in the military and government needed to be answered.¹

By the time General Yahya Khan took power in March 1969, East Pakistan was in turmoil.

Yahya was Pakistan's president, foreign minister, defense minister, and chief martial law administrator. Soon after taking office, he began to work towards ending martial law and yielding power to a new elected government. The elections were set for December 7th, 1970.

Yahya and the West Pakistani elite were relaxed and assumed their victory in the elections until

¹ Gary Jonathan Bass, *The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide*, (Alfred A Knopf, 2013) Pg. 20

deadly cyclone devastated East Pakistan on November 13, 1970. 150 mile an hour winds and a 20-foot tidal wave killed at least 230,000 people. The US State Department estimated half a million deaths, mainly due to drowning. At least 90 percent of the area's inhabitants needed relief aid, but West Pakistan provided almost none. The international response to the disaster was much stronger than the meager response by Pakistan, which caused the final break of the Bengalis from Pakistan. ²

Despite the cyclone, Yahya allowed the election to proceed on time. In the election, the Bengali leader was Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman. Mujib was a member of the Awami League and was known to have affection for America. He competed against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of the Pakistan People's Party who was anti-American. There were rallies, parades, and speeches on radio and television. American officials were surprised that there was little violence and the voting was fair and free. ³

The Awami League won 167 seats and Mujib stood to be prime minister of all Pakistan. Bhutto and Yahya were thrown together in the days following the election due to their mutual fear of losing East Pakistan and hatred of India. On March 1, Yahya indefinitely postponed the opening of the National Assembly. This looked like electoral theft to the Bengali and the next day they began a general strike. ⁴

Mujib did not declare independence for East Pakistan, but leaders continued to talk while the military increased its presence in East Pakistan. On March 25, 1971 the military began a preplanned massacre called "Operation Searchlight" to suppress the demand for regional autonomy. This began the civil war, or war for national liberation in the view of the Bengali, which triggered a massive flight of Hindu refugees to India. The current Bangladesh government

² Ibid., Pg. 21-23

³ Ibid., Pg. 26

⁴ Ibid., Pg. 27-28

has claimed three million deaths occurred over the course of the war. Widespread rape of women is also reported to be numbered around 200,000. ⁵

By April nearly a million refugees had fled to India's impoverished border states which placed pressure on Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to involve India in the conflict. There was a self-serving reason for India to become involved; leaders of India felt that if Pakistan was ripped apart India would come to dominate South Asia. However, an imminent monsoon prevented Indian ground operations until December. India did fund the Bengali forces in the meantime. On December 4th, Indian forces began fighting and on December 16, 1971 the Pakistan army formally surrendered to India and an independent Bangladesh was created. ⁶

The charge of genocide is a polarized topic within national politics of Bangladesh. There is an academic consensus that the campaign of violence against Hindus was a genocide and for some even acknowledging the debate trivializes the matter. This is important to citizens of Bangladesh as Pakistan attempts to hide the genocide from young students within their education system in order to block the extent of the crime. The United Nations defines a genocide as having two main elements; the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, and the physical element which includes killing and causing serious bodily or mental harm. The physical element can also include measures to prevent births in the group and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group, which did not occur in this case. Both elements of genocide were present; therefore, the event meets the qualifications to be defined as a genocide. ⁷

⁵ Norman Kenneth Swazo, *Questioning Islamic Belief in Post-Genocide Bangladesh: Bangladesh: Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites*, Maya and Sohail, (2018)

⁶ Gary Jonathan Bass, *The Blood Telegram : Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide* (Alfred A Knopf, 2013), Pg. 92-99

⁷ United Nations, *United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect*, (United Nations) Accessed January 16, 2020.

This genocide reflected a form of racism. The Pakistani elite were condescending towards the Bengali and viewed them as a conquered people who were “half-Muslims.” Demonization of the Bengali was passed on through indoctrination of the military which included a short psychology course where the Bengalis were depicted as traitors who loved India, and who were not true Muslims. Bengali Hindus made up 10 percent of the population and were a target, but no one was spared. Columnist Tarek Fatah claimed that the root of the problem was one group of Muslims felt they were racial superior to another group. The Bengali culture was seen as un-Islamic and influenced by Hinduism, which led to their music, cuisine, and attire being mocked. Wardatul Akram claimed that the West Pakistani forces wanted to purify the Bengali Muslims by making them abandon Bengali cultural traits as they believed the Bengali nation was a decedent of aboriginal Indian tribes.⁸ Ethnic cleaning has been defined by the United Nations as “rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area”. Therefore, the West Pakistan forces committed ethnic cleansing in the course of the genocide against the Bengali.⁹

War crimes also occurred during this conflict. West Pakistan’s forces committed war crimes as rape is defined as a war crime by the United Nations. They also killed many Bengali civilian women and children. Bengali rebel fighters also committed war crimes by conscripting children as young as ten into their forces. These children were forced into abysmal camps and were trained in guerrilla warfare. This practice was even acknowledged by the Indian Prime Minister who made a speech thanking children as young as 12 for fighting.¹⁰ According to the United

⁸ Norman Kenneth Swazo, *Questioning Islamic Belief in Post-Genocide Bangladesh: Bangladesh: Mu’tazilites and Ash’arites*, Maya and Sohail, (2018)

⁹ United Nations, *United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect*, (United Nations) Accessed January 16, 2020.

¹⁰ Gary Jonathan Bass, *The Blood Telegram : Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide* (Alfred A Knopf, 2013),Pg. 190

Nations, a war crime must occur in the context of an armed conflict and there must be intent and knowledge of the act and its context. Both of these elements were present, so war crimes can be said to have occurred during this conflict. ¹¹

This genocide could have been prevented by action of the international community, particularly the United States. The United States President Richard Nixon refused to help stop this genocide. An arms embargo had been placed on Pakistan, which Nixon broke by illegally selling weapons to General Yahya. Nixon also refused to stop economic and military aid in order to help India push Pakistan out of Bangladesh. Nixon had been warned by American diplomat Archer Blood in a telegraph that the United States was enabling genocide, but Nixon refused to change course because he felt that the United States couldn't get involved in Pakistan's "internal affairs". Nixon should have condemned Yahya and supported Indian efforts at the least in order to prevent the genocide. ¹²

In certain ways, the British also have responsibility due to tensions created by the partition of India. In creating Pakistan, they failed to recognize the cultural difference between Muslims in West Pakistan and East Pakistan. They created a country where certain groups had more power. It was inevitable that the discriminated group would develop a desire for greater power and rights. Genocides such as the Armenian genocide show that authoritarian governments can respond to calls for greater rights with mass violence. The British should have created Bangladesh in the partition of India and the international community should have been more wary about the elections of 1970. The classification stage of genocide should have been recognized early on.

¹¹ "United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect." United Nations. United Nations. Accessed January 16, 2020.

¹² Gary Jonathan Bass, *The Blood Telegram : Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide* (Alfred A Knopf, 2013), Pg. 152

Determining appropriate punishment for this genocide is difficult as many parties bear responsibility. Indian forces and Bangali rebels committed a war crime in recruiting children into their army and should be held accountable. Nixon also should have been held accountable by the law because he enabled the genocide through providing arms to the West Pakistan army. An international trial of West Pakistani military leaders including General Yahya was also needed because prosecuting genocide is an act of symbolic disapproval by the international community. These trials must also be monitored by independent NGOS, media outlets, and ordinary citizens in order to protect justice. Additionally, Pakistan should follow the example of Germany and take responsibility for the genocide, ban hate speech, and educate their citizens about cultural diversity in order to prevent a future occurrence of genocide.¹³

The long-term impacts of this genocide include greater acceptance of violence and more prevalent armed violence within Bangladesh. There has been great division within Bangladesh society due to failure to hold collaborators in the genocide accountable. The post-1975 government, which was formed after an army coup, allowed crimes to be unpunished in exchange for pledging political support. Additionally, many Hindus felt unsafe and did not return to Bangladesh. Women who were abused in the course of the war have taken part in society through paid economic work, but violence against women has not diminished. There has never been an apology from Pakistan and Pakistan, the United States, and other Islamist countries continue to deny that the genocide occurred.¹⁴ Only in 2019 did Adama Dieng, the U.N.

¹³ Bloxham, Donald, and A. Dirk Moses, eds. "Punishment as Prevention." Oxford Handbooks Online, 2012, 631–37. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199232116.001.0001>.

¹⁴ Totten, Samuel, and William S. Parsons, *Centuries of Genocide: Essays and Eyewitness Accounts*, (New York: Routledge, 2013), Pg. 261-264

secretary-general's special adviser on the prevention of genocide, say that the U.N. will raise the issue of Pakistan Genocide in Bangladesh. ¹⁵

The creation of Bangladesh as an independent nation in 1971 involved great violence. A genocide was committed against the Bengali people by the West Pakistan army that could also be called ethnic cleansing. The war crimes committed by both sides call for justice through trials held by international courts. Sadly, this genocide could have been prevented by actions of the United States and the United Kingdom. There were many points that the genocide could have been recognized and prevented, but in order to restore justice international trials need to be conducted and Pakistan should take responsibility for preventing future genocide by educating their citizens.

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¹⁵ John Salzberg, *UN Prevention of Human Rights Violations: The Bangladesh Case*, *International Organization* 27, no. 1 (1973): 115-27. Accessed February 24, 2020.

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“Nazi’s Plan for Slavs in Belarus”

Sophia Wooden

During World War II, the Nazis committed astounding atrocities against the Jewish people of Europe. This, however, was not the only group that they specifically targeted. Although the Jewish people received the majority of hatred, Nazis also had gruesome plans for the handicapped, the Romani, and the Slavs. The Nazi’s plan for the Slavs in areas like Belarus was known as “Generalplan Ost” and was a part of their greater plan for “Lebensraum.” They were not able to carry out their plan the way they originally intended, but throughout World War II Belarus lost a third of its population and experienced horrible atrocities at the hands of the Nazis, which is why the Nazi’s actions in Belarus should also be considered a genocide.

The Nazis drew out a specific plan for areas like Belarus, where they would kill the majority of the population, move the rest into slave labor, and allow for German people to move into these lands for greater “living space.” Even in the early years of forming his dreams for the German people, Adolf Hitler saw land as an important factor. Hitler called for the concept of “lebensraum” outlining that extra land for the Germans would help bring about their salvation.¹ He also denounced looking overseas for this land and, instead, said this land should be taken from the East (Europe), saying in *Mein Kampf* that, “If one wanted land and soil in Europe, this could happen, by and large, only at Russia's expense.”² This shows that Hitler had planned to

¹Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, *The German Myth of the East: 1800 to the Present*, (Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2010), 174.

²Ibid, 174.

take land to the East of Europe and use it for Germans. Later on, in 1940, Heinrich Himmler, with the approval of Hitler, wrote a secret memorandum titled *Some Thoughts on the Treatment of Ethnic Aliens in the East* that described plans to find and separate all the ethnic groups (Poles and Jewish people, the Ukrainians, Belarusians, Goralen, Lemkos, and Kashubians) to then eliminate the ethnicities through extermination and use the remaining people for the Germans benefits (slavery).³ Additionally, any children that were found to have German blood would be sent back to Germany to be re-educated and renamed.⁴ Himmler's plan for attaining land for the Germans was to exterminate the majority and put the rest into slavery. The Nazis had a very distinct plan for the East that was shown to be different than their military plans to the West. Hitler, himself, stated the following in March 1941, was before Hitler officially turned on the Soviet Union, "The battle will be very different from the battle in the West. In the East, being severe is kinder for the future."⁵ Hitler had a strong dislike for all that was East of the Nazi Empire, arguing that there was no benefit in not completely diminishing the East. He declared the war, "a new kind of war, freed of civilized constraints: a war of ideologies and racial enemies,"⁶ showing that for him, it was not just about winning a war or expanding his empire, but about wiping out those he believed to not be worthy of existence. As Himmler, who was mainly in charge of how Slavic people would be treated, continued to plan for the Slavic ethnic groups, he declared that they should not be bothered to educate them or improve them, "it is a crime against [German] blood to worry about them and give them ideals."⁷ There was no

³Ibid, 187.

⁴Ibid, 187.

⁵Ibid, 192.

⁶Ibid, 192.

⁷Ibid, 200.

movement for the Germanization of Slavic people. Those who had significant amounts of German blood were to be sent back to Germany and forced to forget their Slavic roots, but other than that, there was no push for Germanization. For Himmler, it did not matter if those in areas like Belarus were allowed to “improve” or “become German,” stating that, “whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only insofar as we need them as slaves for our culture: otherwise, it is of no interest to me.”⁸ This shows that Himmler did not view Belarusians and other Slavic people on the same level as Germans or even as fully human, their only purpose was to be slaves to the Germans. Dehumanization is an important step to genocide, which the Germans started during towards Slavic people.

From all of Hitler’s and Himmler’s ideas about Slavic people, the “Generalplan Ost” (General Plan for the East) was completed and presented to Himmler in May 1942. This was about a year after attacking the Soviet Union but was in the works before they attacked the USSR. The plan declared that after the war, over twenty-five years, an estimated thirty-one million people in the regions the Nazis sought to conquer, that were not killed, were to be sent to Siberia and the remaining fourteen million were to be kept as slaves.⁹ Specifically for the Belarusians (or the “White Russians”), 75% of their population was to be sent to Siberia, to eventually die, while the remaining 25% would be used as slaves.¹⁰ This shows the planning of genocide, the majority of the population in the East was to be deported or killed, and the rest to be enslaved. Additionally, this plan drew out how ten million German people would be moved

⁸Ibid, 200.

⁹Ibid, 200.

¹⁰Robert Gellately, “Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan Czeslaw Madajczyk”, *Central European History*. Volume 29(2), 271.

into these lands and benefit off of the slave labor.¹¹ Their plans were certainly horrific, yet they soon showed to be unrealistic. It underestimated the number of people in the East, it was closer to 60-65 million, overestimated the number of Germans who were able to move there, which was closer to 8 million, and unrealistically planned for how exactly all these people would be transported.¹² Additionally, the war turned on the Nazis making it impossible for them to carry out their plans. Yet, even as they started to lose, Himmler continued to tinker with the plans for the East and how to make the land suitable for Germans up until the very end.¹³ Which made it clearer than ever that for the Nazis, winning the war was about more than just defeating another army, but also about setting up a racial hierarchy and disposing of those that were not worthy.

Although the Nazis were not able to carry out their exact plans, they did kill millions of Slavs in Belarus, and seriously decimated the population. According to Belarus' current President, "Belarus is the Soviet republic that suffered more than others in fighting the enemy . . . [losing] one-third of its population . . . more than 2,200,000 human lives."¹⁴ Although this number is at times contested, it is widely accepted that Belarus lost a significant amount of its population to the hands of the Nazis. Many historians agree that Belarus suffered the most out of any European country.¹⁵ In all the Soviet Union did have the most deaths and a significant portion of the war took place in Belarus. In Belarus, though, a large portion of the people who died was Jewish, President Lukashenko pointed out in 2005 that the Nazis wanted to exterminate

¹¹Ibid, 271.

¹²Ibid 272.

¹³Liulevicius, *The German Myth of the East: 1800 to the Present*, 201.

¹⁴Alexandra Goujon, "Memorial Narratives of WWII Partisans and Genocide in Belarus," *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 24 (1), 2010, 15.

¹⁵ Ibid, 15.

both Jews and Slavs, and that both Belarusians and Jewish people had their fates sealed when attacked by the Nazis.¹⁶ Of those who died in Belarus, many were not Soviet soldiers. In Belarus, partisan fighters played a large role in fighting off the Nazis, which is what led to Belarus eventually gaining status as a “Hero of the Soviet Union” and cities such as its capital Minsk were given “Hero City” status.¹⁷ This shows that Belarus played a large role in the war and also sacrificed plenty to fight off the Nazis. In total there were 400,000 Belarusian partisans and an additional 70,000 underground fighters were lost.¹⁸ World War II, also called the Great Patriotic War, has culturally become incredibly important to Belarusians as they take pride in the hardships they underwent and all those who volunteered to be partisans. This can be seen as almost six thousand monuments have been created to honor partisans and civilians who died in World War II such as Mount of Glory (Kurgan Slavy) and Victory Square in Minsk.¹⁹ All of this goes to show that WWII had a large impact on Belarus, so although the Nazis did not succeed in winning the war, they did kill countless of them and cause a lot of suffering.

One specific massacre that gives an example of the horrible atrocities carried out by the Nazis is the case of Khatyn. The Nazi’s saw, early on, that Partisan resistance in Belarus would be a problem for them and thus created a policy of taking all food and enslaving the people in “partisan infected” areas, as well as burning down villages that supported partisans in any way and shooting anyone who helped a partisan.²⁰ In 1942, the Nazis created an official policy of

¹⁶Ibid, 15.

¹⁷Ibid, 7.

¹⁸Ibid, 10.

¹⁹Ibid, 11.

²⁰Per Anders Rudling, “The Khatyn Massacre in Belorussia: A Historical Controversy Revisited”, *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* Volum 26 (1), (2012) 33.

making “dead zones” where they would destroy and depopulate an area (showing no regard to how many people in the area were partisans), and then expanded the policy in 1943.²¹ One example of this was the village of Khaytn where, on March 22, 1943, all the residents were herded into a barn where they were burned alive, killing 149 people and leaving one survivor.²² This was a part of the 140, “punitive” action plans to diminish the partisan movement.²³ These mass killings were not uncommon in Belarus and help depict the horrors the Nazis carried out in Belarus. Although Khaytn is not the largest example of a village burning, there were two thousand partisans and civilians were killed in similar Aktionen²⁴ it has gained a lot of attention due to the first-hand accounts of those outside the village, its proximity to the capital Minsk, and the memorial that was built there after the war. It is at this memorial where Nazi’s actions are described as genocidal.²⁵ Khatyn is a horrific memory that has been burned into the minds of many Belarusians. In addition to the barn burning nearby, loggers were also shot at and Schutzmann Knap, a German soldier, described the scene reporting, “The entire place was drenched in blood. ... I saw how Ivankiv was firing...upon the people who were running for cover in the forest, and how Katriuk and Meleshko were shooting the people lying on the road.”²⁶ This depicts just how horrifically the Nazis attacked people in Belarus, continuing the shoot as they fled and even shooting the people already lying on the road drenched in blood, who were presumably already dead. It was clear that they had to make sure everyone was dead. Knap also

²¹Ibed, 33.

²²Ibed, 29.

²³Ibed, 29.

²⁴Ibed, 29.

²⁵Goujon, “Memorial Narratives of WWII Partisans and Genocide in Belarus,” 16.

²⁶Rudling, “The Khatyn Massacre in Belorussia: A Historical Controversy Revisited”, 38.

recalled the screaming and crying caused by the barn burning and multiple officers remember how one child that started to crawl out of the fire had to be shot.²⁷ This, again, shows the lack of mercy that was present when it came to how the Nazis handled the Belarusians, who suffered a great deal because of the Nazis.

Although the events in Belarus have never been labeled officially been labeled “genocide,” it does fit the requirements of one. Genocide literally translates to tribe/race killing, meaning that it is the intentional killing of a particular group of people.²⁸ As Raphael Lemkin, who came up with the term, describes, it, “refers to a coordinated plan aimed at the destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national groups so that these groups wither and die like plants that have suffered a blight.”²⁹ In the case of the Nazis in Belarus, there was a coordinated plan on how to deal with Slavic people. Considering this plan was to send the majority of the people living in Belarus to Siberia where they would wither and die, this situation Lemkin’s description of genocide. Additionally, the tragic events in Belarus also follow the Eight Steps of Genocide laid out by Gregory H. Stanton. Classification and dehumanization³⁰ can be seen in the rhetoric Hitler and Himmler used in describing Slavic people from *Mein Kampf* to the official Generalplan Ost. Symbolization³¹ is harder to be seen but Himmler did include in his original plans for the East that ethnic groups be labeled to make the extermination of them easier later on. Organization and Preparation³² is seen in the planning out of the Generalplan Ost as well as

²⁷Ibid, 38.

²⁸Raphael Lemkin, “Genocide - A Modern Crime”, *Free World* Vol. 4 (April 1945).

²⁹Ibid, 39.

³⁰Gregory H. Stanton, *Eight Stages of Genocide*, 1.

³¹Ibid, 1.

³²Ibid,1-2.

categorizing certain areas as Death Zones later on. Polarization³³ is seen by the fact that Nazis demonized and killed anyone who was interacting with Partisans. Extermination³⁴ is seen by the 2,200,00 people that died and the countless villages that were burnt. Denial³⁵ can be because when the war turned against the Nazis, propaganda pushed those in the East as the evil ones coming to destroy all Germans.³⁶ As all eight steps are seen in Belarus and Nazis were attacking and killing Slavic people solely because they belonged to a group of people Germans viewed as inferior, these events should be categorized as genocide. It is also important to point out that, even though the Jewish Holocaust is what is internationally recognized as the Nazi Genocide, there have been calls to also classify their Generalplan Ost as its genocide. In March 2007, members of the National Boleshev Party of Belarus a small and unrecognized political party sent a petition to the German Embassy in Belarus to recognize the genocide of the Belarusian people.³⁷ Additionally, in one of his speeches about World War II, President Lukashenko said, “Mass genocide crimes were committed by the fascists during the Second World War on the occupied territories, especially against the Slavs (Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Czechs, Poles, Serbs) and ethnic Jews.”³⁸ Both of these show that there is a push in Belarus to recognize the actions against Slavic people as a genocide, not just the actions taken against Jewish people. Overall, the language of genocide is used in describing the actions of the Nazis toward the people of Belarus and a greater emphasis is being placed on the millions of Slavic civilians who died at their hands.

³³Ibid, 2.

³⁴ Ibid, 2.

³⁵Ibid, 3.

³⁶Liulevicius, *The German Myth of the East: 1800 to the Present*, 205.

³⁷Goujon, “Memorial Narratives of WWII Partisans and Genocide in Belarus,” 17.

³⁸Ibid, 16-17.

The Nazis abused numerous laws of war and crimes against humanity in their attack on Belarus. Nazi soldiers were put on trial by the Soviet Union for war crimes (specifically the burning of Khatyn) in the 1950s and 1960s, where most soldiers were sentenced to death or imprisonment in work camps.³⁹ This shows that the Nazi's war crimes are recognized by the world. One war crime that the Nazis did break was, "Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities."⁴⁰ The burning of villages like Khatyn is clearly an example of this. They also violated multiple crimes against the enslavement of other people⁴¹ as they not only planned to enslave 25% of the population but enslaved adults from "partisan-infected" areas. Additionally, it is a crime against humanity to, "[Persecute] against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender,"⁴² which they did as the entire Generalplan Ost and attack on the East was based on their hatred of Slavic people. Countless other examples could be given about how Nazi Germany broke laws of war, crimes against humanity, and human rights laws.

It is important to recognize Genocides to help learn how to prevent them. The actions taken by Nazi Germany in Belarus were not just the effects of war or typical wartime behavior. Hitler and Himmler had very specific plans for carrying out a genocide against the people in Belarus and, although they failed in carrying it out exactly how they planned, Belarus still saw a loss of a third of its population and countless horrific deeds done to its people. While the focus is on the Nazi's action against Jewish people, the Nazis also carried out a genocide against the Belarusian people.

³⁹Rudling, "The Khatyn Massacre in Belorussia: A Historical Controversy Revisited", 17.

⁴⁰ "War Crimes," *United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect*, 1.

⁴¹"Crimes Against Humanity," *United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect*, 1.

⁴²Ibid, 1.

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Section 2

WAR

a.

“Ottoman Military Capabilities in World War I”

Patrick du Bois de Vroylande

Since the foundation of the Ottoman Empire and the destruction of the ancient city of Constantinople, the Ottoman military had been the scythe that carved out vast swaths of the Mediterranean. Similar to the militaries of Europe, the Ottoman military underwent vast changes and alterations throughout its existence. The Ottoman military developed in response to changes in technology and strategy, as progress marched on, so did Ottoman naval tactics and cavalry strategies. Apart from development, the main gauge of a military's effectiveness was its performance. As the scourge of the Mediterranean for hundreds of years, the Sultan and his generals won numerous battles, against both Europeans and Muslim enemies to the south and east. Centuries of military development and conflict led to a peak for the Ottomans, this peak came in the form of World War I, known at the time as The Great War. World War I was the last hurrah for the Ottoman Empire, which would see its official end in the years following World War I. In the decades leading up to World War I, the Ottoman Empire was facing numerous challenges both internally and abroad. One example was how the leadership of the CUP had planned for resistance in Anatolia in anticipation of defeat in the First World War (Mango, 3). The Committee of Union and Progress was a political organization that later on became an official political party that fought for democratization and modernization of the Ottoman Empire. With such internal resistance during such a monumental war, the Ottoman war efforts were

greatly affected. This paper will aim to analyze the events leading up to World War I regarding the Ottoman military, and how development and preparedness affected the Ottoman war effort.

The series of events that gave insight into the future of Ottoman military capabilities were the series of wars fought in the Balkans and the Black Sea regions by the Ottomans. Author, Brian Davies explains in his book, *Empire and Military Revolution in Eastern Europe: Russia's Turkish Wars in the Eighteenth Century*, that the state of the Ottoman military in the mid-18th century was that of one which was stretched thin across its empire. In his novel, Davies writes:

“the *toprakli* militias were financed out of provincial taxes...they became less reliable as tax farms evolved into *malikane* lifetime grants, this resulting in less fixed and budgetable revenue and putting the collection of revenue under the control of *malikane* holders who became power brokers increasingly independent of the provincial governors” (Davies, 187).

This Russo-Turkish War being from 1735-1739 gave insight into the early stages of the dissemination of power at the lower levels of military recruitment for the Ottoman military. Power was slowly diminished, and not even necessarily through military defeats, but through minor changes in taxation policy. It was changed like this that began having significant effects on Ottoman policy and the ability to wage war effectively. The Ottomans struggled in their wars against Russia and with each loss came new shortcomings. For example, when the series of wars known as the Balkan Wars came around in the early 20th century, the Ottoman empire has been making efforts to improve mobilization and technologies, however, so had the Balkan states. In his review of *The Ottoman Culture of Defeat: The Balkan Wars and Their Aftermath*, Mehmet Beşikçi wrote:

“Though the Ottomans had been defeated in a number of previous wars, this newly total character of conflict was a main contributor in making the defeat in the First Balkan War

extremely traumatic. News of mass atrocities and an exodus of Muslim families from the Balkans into Anatolia accompanied the humiliation on the battlefield and the loss of territories in Rumelia, the heartland of the Young Turk movement” (Beşikçi, 1).

Significant efforts were being made to address disparities in the military, but other factors detracted from those same efforts.

The loss of the Balkan wars to countries like Bulgaria and Serbia was a painful loss for the Ottomans. Not only did they lose their profitable European territory, but their military acclaim as well due to defeat by former subjects. Not only does a defeat like this affect the military confidence of a nation but it greatly affects the perception of that nation by the rest of the world. By 1913 the Ottoman Empire acquired the famous nickname “the sick man of Europe”, given to them by nations like France, Russia, and Great Britain. What reflected badly upon the military was its poor ability to mobilize at the outbreak of the First Balkan War. Beşikçi writes, “the Ottomans performed this mobilization poorly, the emphasis on its necessity dominated the Ottoman war discourse from the beginning of the war through the post-defeat debates” (Beşikçi, 1). What the Ottoman Empire always seemed to do well was recognize which aspects of their military were outdated and subsequently fixed them, unlike certain European counterparts. Much like the reformations under Sultan Mahmud II, the Balkan wars taught the Ottomans several valuable lessons in military preparedness as well as which traditions were worth maintaining and which should be scrapped and replaced. These lessons taught the Ottoman generals and leadership how victory might be achieved in the future. From the 18th century to the early 20th century, Ottoman defeats did in fact outline the difficulties that the empire faced from within and out. Little did anyone know that in 1914, the abilities of the Ottoman military would be put to the test, and the future of the empire would be determined.

As World War I was brewing and was near to sparking off, the alliance system of Europe was being finalized. Ottoman administration was looking to choose a viable side in the coming war. As Ian Lyster writes in, *Among the Ottomans: Diaries from Turkey in World War I*, the British had anticipated the coming war and illegally retained two warships that were being built in Britain and had been paid for by the Ottoman Empire (Lyster, xxiv). The British's action was blatantly illegal and reflected their intentions quite plainly to the rest of the world. The Ottomans, now being deprived of two warships that they rightfully owned were put in an interesting position. Germany was looking for allies, while at the same time had an immensely powerful arsenal of military technology, technology which the Ottoman Empire was lacking at the moment. As German interest was sparked, the British attempted at remedying their mistake by proposing a loan, Lyster writes:

“My father comments on p.89 of his diaries that he had been party to a British proposal to send 10 million Turkish pounds as a loan to keep Turkey with the Allies, but Germany countered with two million pounds in gold and the ships; this offer prevailed” (Lyster, xxiv).

The Ottoman Empire was a strong military actor, otherwise the British may not have shown such interest in their allied status.

The partnership between the Ottoman Empire and the German Empire seemed to be the most viable option for both parties. However, there were some concerns in regards to the Ottomans' ability to repay the loans that were being offered by the Germans. From the Ottoman perspective, who cares? A major military power is offering naval vessels which you desperately need in the coming conflict and loans in gold? That is a deal that should be accepted. Along with

that initial loan plan put forth by Germany, more deals were struck. Writer, Ulrich Trumpener stated in the journal, *German Military Aid to Turkey in 1914: An Historical Re-Evaluation*:

“The Turkish War Minister, Enver Pasha, notified the German ambassador in Constantinople, Hans von Wangenheim, that the Ottoman armed forces needed almost half a million artillery shells, two hundred thousand rifles, as well as other supplies. His request for speedy delivery of these items from Germany was supported by the chief of the German military mission in Turkey, General Otto Liman von Sanders” (Trumpener, 146).

It seems as though regardless of the previous state of Ottoman credit, Germany was motivated to provide military support, which for the Ottomans was welcome. Along with the support of Germany, the Ottomans had to focus on their military development. Their previous issue of mobilization during the Balkan wars didn't bode well for them at the beginning of World War I. At the very least, the Ottoman attitude toward the importance of being able to mobilize for a massive conflict had changed a bit. Mehmet Beşikçi noted in, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War: Between Voluntarism and Resistance*, that:

“The tendency towards totality in the Ottoman mobilization for war was evident even in the very term for “mobilization” (seferberlik) used by the Ottomans. Especially in popular usage, the word “seferberlik” was used not only in the specific sense of manpower mobilization for the armed forces, but also in a more general sense for the entire war experience” (Beşikçi, 5).

With a statement such as this being the motto of the Ottoman mobilization effort, one would imagine that the Ottoman military would have been prepared for World War I at its outbreak. This was not true, neither at the outbreak of the war nor for that matter during the war in many ways. Often at times, the critical infrastructure of the Ottoman military was not properly prepared, organized, or maintained. Hikmet Özdemir expressed that:

“one reason behind the enormous loss of life in the war was the insufficient number of medical staff and hospitals.’ The clothing and food provided to the soldiers also were far from being adequate. Whereas the hospital in Erzurum had only 900 beds, at times as many as 15,000 sick and wounded gathered in that city” (Özdemir, 51)

According to Özdemir, on several Russo-Ottoman fronts, the Ottoman medical preparedness was atrocious. Soldiers were freezing to death on mass and the facilities that were put in place to deal with battlefield casualties were vastly undersupplied (Özdemir). With the war going so poorly for the Ottoman Empire by 1916, it became evident that not only was the military not ready for such a massive conflict, but even the expectations of those in civil and medical service were unprepared. With a military that was losing on the Russian front and could not properly care for those who were wounded, the Ottoman military had to look towards other avenues of prosperity. It should be noted that throughout World War I, the Ottoman Empire maintained support from the German Empire at the behest of Kaiser Wilhelm II, who voiced the strongest level of support for them while many of his advisors and generals argued against it (Lyster). This support from the Kaiser placed the Ottoman Empire in a position of pity from German generals and officials, they believed they were carrying dead weight in the forms of the Austro-Hungarians and Ottomans. In many ways this was true, the German Empire would end up sending advisors and commanders to organize the Ottomans. German companies were also pressured into providing arms to the Ottomans. In others it was not, The Ottoman military would end up defending borders that vastly outstretched the Germans and would have to fight highly mobile wars in unforgiving landscapes. What matters here is the state of the Ottoman military and its ability to fight effectively.

The stories of World War I revolve around the Western front, places like Ypres and the Sommes, however, much of the war was determined on different fronts across the world. The

Ottoman Empire did their fair share of fighting across their empire, near the heart of the empire, Gallipoli came under attack (Stevenson). What would happen on the Gallipoli Peninsula would come to be known as one of the most famous battles of the war, and expressed itself as an outlier in the Ottoman military record. The British planned to attack the Gallipoli Peninsula with a massive force made up of ANZAC (Australia and New Zealand Army Corps) troops, Indian troops, and native British soldiers (Sheffield). This attack was intended to catch the “weak” Ottomans by surprise and threaten their Capital of Istanbul, which was just north of Gallipoli. Stevenson writes, “Although the pre-landing intelligence assessment was that the Turks were a poor opponent in reality, the British underestimated their enemy in every quarter” (Stevenson, 116). The British command did underestimate the ability of the Ottoman Army to fend off an attack this close to home. At the very least, at least the Ottomans didn’t have those two dreadnoughts at their disposal, a stronger Ottoman fleet could have stopped the British before they even hit the beaches. That then begs the question, would a stronger Ottoman fleet have deterred the British from making the attempt on Gallipoli, which would have then spared them from a disastrous military defeat? When counting losses and comparing between the British and their losses, the Ottomans tallied up their casualties and, although losing thousands of men, could better understand how to minimize casualties. The British, being the assaulting force, lost an incredible number of troops, a devastating loss that would haunt British command. In Victor J. Kamenir’s, *I Order You to Die*, he outlines the strategies of the Ottoman Empire in the battle and eventually tallies up the losses on both sides:

“During the height of the Dardanelles campaign, Liman von Sanders commanded 22 infantry divisions in the Fifth Army. Turkish losses amounted to 66,000 men killed and 152,000 wounded. Of those wounded, 42,000 soldiers were later returned to duty. Allied casualties reached upward of 200,000 men killed, wounded, or missing in action” (Kamenir, 12).

The result of the British underestimation of the Ottomans resulted in a huge boost in morale for the struggling empire and reflected well on Ottoman commanders. On the same note, the lessons learned by the Ottomans during the battle of Gallipoli taught them the importance of having artillery present on the battlefield and that the placement of machine guns in crucial points in the battle lines could change the outcome in the battle. That in itself is one large reason for the Ottomans' victory, the use of machine guns in this type of environment had not yet been seen in the war. A victory at Gallipoli also gave the Ottoman Empire the newfound security that the British would not attempt another assault so close to Istanbul, they never did.

More evidence of the Ottoman military struggle to organize itself is evident when observing Palestine before and during the war. Before fighting had reached Palestine, the Ottomans were already experiencing issues. When the alliance with Germany was declared and war with Russia was announced, mobilization orders were sent across the empire (Jacobson). In her book, *From Empire To Empire: Jerusalem Between Ottoman and British Rule*, Abigail Jacobson expresses how calls for mobilization in Palestine were initially met with joyous applause and support from all sections of society in Palestine (Jacobson). Muslims, Jews, and Christians, all supported the empire:

“A big parade of the drafted soldiers took place in the streets of Jerusalem, which was accompanied by a military band and some speeches. Some of the soldiers were reported as addressing Zeki Bey, the military commander in Jerusalem, saying how proud they were to serve the Ottoman homeland” (Jacobson, 26-27).

From this positive response, we can see that the military situation, even in terms of confidence, was far from poor from the Ottoman perspective.

It did appear as though support for the war was unanimous among the many different people groups in the empire. Palestine, in particular, represented a source of motivation for Ottoman commanders, what with the fervent support for the war from so many different ethnic and religious groups. However, this attitude seemed to shift dramatically as the war carried on and the economy in the region was strained by draught, blockade, and expulsions of minority groups (Jacobson). Eventually, in cities like Jerusalem and Jaffa, draft-dodging became so prolific that local authorities had to search for and punish draft dodgers who hid across the cities (Jacobson). The inefficiency of the Ottoman military and bureaucracy was outlined when local authorities in Palestine known as mukhtars were known for accepting bribes from the draft dodgers and their families in exchange for their silence (Jacobson). The trust that Istanbul had placed in its local officials and bureaucrats had failed, and the competence of the Ottoman military was called into question as they were responsible for overseeing the authorities of Palestine during the war. What was going moderately well was the campaign against the British Empire in the southern Palestinian region/Arabian Peninsula. Leading the British forces in the region was Field Marshal Edmund Allenby, who was commanded by British higher-ups to put pressure on the Ottoman positions in 1917 (Lowry). Field Marshal Allenby would find success in fighting the Ottomans in the latter half of the war when the Arab Revolt, which was assisted by the famous T.E. Lawrence, opened another front, of which the Ottomans had to defend (Lowry). Much of Allenby's success could also have been attributed to the fact that:

“Allenby's army was a multinational force with French, Italian and Jewish contingents and units from empire countries. He employed three corps...by late summer 1917, the Arabs were under his command and would secure his east flank. The Royal Navy would secure the west flank along the Mediterranean coast and provide sustainment support” (Lowry, 72).

By 1917, the British army had been able to focus huge amounts of effort towards the downfall of the Ottomans. With its superior navy putting pressure on the Levant coast and numerous campaigns being launched into the Ottoman interior, it was only a matter of time until Palestine fell to the British (Jacobson). All of the past events in World War I played into the hands of the British when it came to fighting the Ottomans in the southern Palestinian/Arabian Peninsula. Lying to the Arab tribes played right into the hands of the British, who subsequently did not give them their freedom after the warlike they said. Similarly, it was in large part the fault of the British for the partitioning of the former Ottoman territory after the war. Based solely on its existence in the area that it did, the Ottoman Empire faced a slew of issues when fighting in the War. Its centralized command structure was combatted with the help of German advisors who were instrumental in the organization of the Ottoman army and navy. What the Ottoman military did attempt to do was to learn from past mistakes and to grow from them. The mistake of ill-preparedness in the Balkan Wars led to an embarrassing defeat which drove Ottoman leaders to better prepare for another large-scale war. What the Ottomans were not able to do successfully was anticipate a war of such scale and magnitude. Unlike their German counterparts, the Ottomans did not have modern artillery, nor the ammunition to utilize that artillery. Much like what would happen in World War II, the Ottomans functioned like the Italians would, later on, their military was a bit too out of date and the German allies would have to step in to support their ally. For all of their faults in the war, the Ottoman military did better than any power could have done in that situation. Their empire was beginning to fragment, they were fighting on every front across their empire, and still, they fought the Russians back, the British, and the Slavic nations for as long as they could. With mass desertions and disloyalty from their officials. The Ottoman military was a product of centuries of conflict and development, fighting from Vienna to Morocco. An empire more tolerant of mediocrity would not have survived and thrived for so long, but then...the Ottomans were never mediocre.

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“What Goes Up Must Come Down: The Erosion of Print Media Coverage on the Occupation of Alcatraz”

Michael Maloney

In 1969, a group of American Indian college students challenged the most powerful government in the world, the United States, by taking Alcatraz Island for themselves and commanded the Nixon administration to listen to their plights. Shockingly, the American government and people did begin to listen to the outcry created by this movement. The occupation of Alcatraz is a remarkable event in history by which a minoritized group of people took on the United States but the event is often completely ignored in scholarly literature. It is a shame this event does not garner more attention from political science because it is an amazing example of an oppressed group physically challenging the government without receiving immediate opposition. Both the government and the media reacted positively towards the occupation at its inception which is highly uncharacteristic for the time. Usually, the media automatically opposes militant social movements but they oddly supported the occupation of Alcatraz at the beginning. Unfortunately, the media eventually started to report on the event very negatively with no warning. Why did this happen? How did the media support erode the occupation of Alcatraz?

After reviewing the literature from accomplished scholars in political science, I have gathered three key answers to this question. These answers consist of the Confrontational school, the Failure to Compromise school, and the Deterioration school of thought. The Deterioration argument appears to be the most adequate in explaining the erosion of media coverage

throughout occupation. The deterioration of the island is characterized by the decrease in the quality of life, or the decrease in access to necessary commodities, increase in social conflict, and the occurrence of tragic events. The media support for the occupation eroded because the increase of deterioration on the island created a negative image of Alcatraz which the media attributed to the presence of the American Indian activists.

The Occupation of Alcatraz and Media Support Debate

Three major scholarly arguments focus on the degradation of positive media coverage for the occupation of Alcatraz which is the Confrontational school, the Failure to Compromise school, and the Deterioration School. The Confrontational school states that media support for the occupation decreased because the American Indians utilized confrontational methods and violence as strategies of protest. The Failure to Compromise argument focuses on the inability of the occupiers to accept the federal compromises provided by the Nixon administration which inevitably decreased media support for the occupation because the demands the Indians were adamant for were impractical uses of the island. Lastly, the Deterioration school of thought asserts that the media support eroded as the occupation wore on because life and conditions on the island deteriorated and the deterioration was attributed to the presence of the American Indians. The attribution of deterioration to the American Indians decreased media support because it displayed how the American Indians and their demands were bad for the island since their presence was making the island worse. It is important to discuss the details of each of these schools to best understand the argument of media support regarding Alcatraz.

The Confrontational school of thought asserts that media support is diminished when a group utilizes confrontational strategies and tactics to achieve its goals. In other words, scholars argue that the main catalyst of the increase in negative media coverage of the occupation was the

increase in militant nature on the island, such as shooting arrows at passing boats. Wetzel supports this claim by illustrating how the media displayed images that negatively portrayed the occupants of the island as criminals or violent actors later in the occupation (2012, 161). Hepler states that positive media coverage dissipated when militant American Indian activists started to seize land, referring to Alcatraz (2009, 22). Hepler also asserts that confrontational tactics “alienated support from the administration and media” (2009, 65). Churchill supports this statement when he declares that the militant nature of the occupation led to the government reacting more negatively towards American Indian activism (1994, 253). The Confrontational school is also rooted and reinforced by the theories of political social movements articulated by Chenoweth and Gurr. Chenoweth asserts that nonviolence is imperative for protests and that social movements must not mix nonviolent and violent tactics to be successful (2016). The occupation of Alcatraz began to mix nonviolence and militant behavior in the later months after its inception, which Gurr reinforces this claim when he states that violence alienates support from the general public (1989, 17). Thus, the Confrontational argument contends that media support decreased for the occupation of Alcatraz when they began to utilize confrontational tactics.

The Failure to Compromise school argues that the media support decreased for the occupation because they refused to accept the proposals from the government and their demands seemed to be impractical uses for the island. The government proposed to the activists to reformulate the island into a national park and institute a museum to commemorate the occupation, but the American Indian negotiators consistently refused the idea of reducing the island to an “Indian theme park” (Strange and Loo 2001, 62). Strange and Loo argue that the American Indians’ hardened position on the proposal softened media and governmental support

(2001, 62-63). In other terms, after the consistent refusal to compromise with the government the media stopped taking the occupation seriously. Crum supplements Strange and Loo's argument by including how Nixon's administration was responding to similar protests in other locations throughout the country, such as establishing a Chicano-Indian University (2007, 13). Although Heppler does not consider the Failure to Compromise school the center focus of his argument, he does note that the Nixon administration returned Blue Lakes to American Indian activists (2009, 65-66), which displays a specific example of the government responding to American Indian demands. Furthermore, Deloria, Jr. critiques that the occupation's inability to create requests that the government could respond to was the downfall of their support (1994, 28). With the combination of the refusals to accept proposals and the inability of the occupation to create a substantial basis for the government to respond to, the media ceased to report on Alcatraz as a serious movement. Therefore, the Failure to Compromise school of thought suggests that media support for the occupation of Alcatraz dissipated because of the occupation's inability to accept the compromises of the government compared to other American Indian activist groups.

The Deterioration argument states that negative media coverage increased as the deterioration of the conditions on the island increased. The deterioration and the conditions on the island are typically characterized as the decrease of accessibility to necessities such as electricity and water, the presence of social conflict and discourse between occupiers and non-occupiers on the direction of the occupation, and tragic events. Millner argues that the media coverage was positive during the initial seizure of land because the occupiers utilized satire, or at least that is how it was portrayed, to garner attention to American Indian concerns (2014, 75-76). Millner then asserts that the positive media coverage disappeared as the conditions decreased because morale on the island decreased and social conflict increased (2014, 80-81). Furthermore,

DeLuca describes the deterioration of the conditions on the island as “boredom increased, anti-drug/alcohol rules violated, the security force became more vocal and militant, media were harassed, animosity formed between mainland Indian groups and militants on the island” (1983, 16). Most importantly, Millner states that the negative media coverage correlated with negative events, such as the death of Yvonne Oakes and an outbreak of fires that took place on the island (2014, 81-82). Johnson illustrates the increase of social conflict in leadership disputes and the presence of non-American Indian people, such as hippies and tourists, and a large controversial fire that broke out which was blamed on the occupiers but was characterized as arson from an outside source (1994, 70-73). The leadership disputes refer to the possible allegations from Richard Oake’s supporters that another chief on the island’s son murdered Yvonne, and the fires refer to contradictory reports that white backlashes were responsible for the fires as opposed to the occupiers themselves. Furthermore, Amarillo, Crum, DeLuca, Johnson, and Millner all mention the major tragedy which played a significant role in the downfall of the occupation’s support, which is the death of Yvonne Oakes, Richard Oake’s daughter (2012, 19; 2007, 10; 1983, 16; 1994, 70; 2014, 82). They all argue that Yvonne’s death was the catalyst that started the decrease in media support. Therefore, there is a substantive base among all the authors that negative events that contributed to the deterioration of the island had prominent roles in the increase in negative media coverage.

The Deterioration school of thought is the most convincing argument among all the scholarly debates because it adequately describes how media coverage was initially positive and provides plausible variables that contribute to the erosion of media coverage. The Confrontational school of thought argues that media support dissipated when the occupiers on the island became more militant and aggressive. However, the violent nature of the occupation

did not appear until much later in the life span of the movement and the negative media coverage was already present far before the incendiary behaviors began. Therefore, it does not seem to be the Confrontational school that impacted media support the most because there was negative media coverage before the American Indians started to be more militant and violent. The Failure to Compromise school of thought does seem to have a stronger base than the previous school but appears to not play as much of a significant role for similar reasons. The negative media coverage tends to be exhibited before the introduction of any proposal from the government. Furthermore, the increase in negative media coverage is not as dramatic following the refusals as compared to the deterioration on the island. The deterioration that manifests itself as the tragic events, such as Yvonne's death, and social conflict between members of the island is the most present before the ignition of the drop-in media support. Additionally, the deterioration variables are the most consistent throughout the entire duration of the occupation as compared to the other two schools' variables that are present in small bursts and scattered throughout the timeline. Therefore, the Deterioration school seems to be the most plausible argument to analyze.

Deterioration and the Erosion of Media Coverage

The media support on the occupation of the island was initially uncharacteristically sympathetic for an American Indian social movement but this drastically changed. As the occupation wore on, the positive media coverage eroded into a more negative tone. The erosion of the media coverage appears to be congruent with the deterioration of the conditions on the island. In simple terms, the argument could be understood as:

Level of Deterioration On Alcatraz	→	Level of Negative Media Coverage
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In other words, if *the level of deterioration on the island increases, then there will be an increase in negative media coverage of the occupation*. The level of deterioration will take the form of the decrease in access to water and electricity, the increase in social conflict, or discourse between leaders on the island and occupiers and non-occupiers, and tragic events such as the death of Yvonne Oake's and fires. A high level of deterioration would be the presence of two or more of these factors at once. The level of negative media coverage will be characterized by a high percentage of negatively toned articles about the total amount of articles reporting on the occupation.

Print Media Deterioration with the Island

The increased level of deterioration among the occupiers and the island affected the tone of the media coverage. To test the relationship, I will conduct a comparative analysis of multiple print media sources with a chronological timeline of conditions and events that transpired amid the duration of the occupation. Print media is the most significant type of media to evaluate because Heppler states that print media "tends to sustain coverage on events for longer" (2009, 19). Heppler further argues that print media strived to be objective in race-related coverage because many major media sources faced scrutiny for their biased coverage from the civil rights movements of the previous decade (2009, 18). Therefore, it is essential to operationalize what newspapers will be utilized, how to tone will be analyzed, what the deterioration will manifest as, and how to illustrate the relationship.

Newspapers in the U.S. and the Occupation

Before the evaluation, it is important to note that data will only be extracted from newspaper articles between November 20, 1969, the inception of the occupation, and August 31, 1971, a few months after the removal of the American Indians from Alcatraz. A few months

were added to assess what coverage existed and what tone it possessed of the aftermath of the occupation. Assessing the aftermath coverage can provide a possible evaluation of the overall media tone at the end of the occupation. For the analysis, I will focus on four major newspapers: *The Los Angeles Times*, *The New York Times*, and the *Chicago Tribune*. It is important to analyze *The Los Angeles Times* because it is located in one of the largest cities within the state of California, the state the occupation took place, and it can provide coverage of the occupation from the state level. *The New York Times* and the *Chicago Tribune* are adequate papers to study because they are the largest papers in two of the country's largest cities in 1970 (Wetzel 2012, 157). New York was the largest city in the United States at the time and *The New York Times* provided national news to a significant amount of the national population. Furthermore, the *Chicago Tribune* is an acceptable paper to evaluate because Chicago was a headquarters location for many social movement groups.

The search engines that will be used are *ProQuest Research Database* and *Newspapers.com*. *ProQuest* is one of the leading research databases for universities and has a large database of newspaper archives that the *New York Times*'s data will be extracted. Unfortunately, *ProQuest* did not contain the necessary data for both the *Los Angeles Times* and the *Chicago Tribune*. Therefore, the archival data for these sources will be obtained through *Newspapers.com* which has one of the largest databases that is solely dedicated to historical preservations of newspapers. People are capable of adding news articles each day through the portal that may not have been collected by universities. To begin the search, I utilized certain keywords to specify the topics of the news articles. The keywords used were: Alcatraz, occupation of Alcatraz, American Indian, Native American, Indian, activist, activism, protest, national park service, and San Francisco. The search terms were intentionally vague to discover

as many news articles on the occupation as possible in an attempt to gather all news stories that covered the occupation of Alcatraz. For the analysis, I plan to focus specifically on the articles that focus only on the specific occupation and occupiers of the island and I will separate the articles that focus on supporters or protesters of the occupation from the initial analysis. The analysis is intended to assess the coverage of the occupation and the relationship between them and the tone of coverage. The addition of other groups separate from the core groups does not correspond with the relationship being evaluated. Lastly, it is important to determine how to measure the tone of the news coverage.

Categorizing newspaper articles as positive or negative is a difficult task. First, what determines something as positive or negative must be defined. Therefore, an article that provides positive media coverage is an article that portrays the activists and the occupation as something that may be beneficial or good for society. On the contrary, an article that consists of negative media coverage would depict the occupation as hazardous or corrosive to society. These definitions are still highly vague and it is difficult to objectively determine an article as positive or negative but the use of specific terminology can help simplify the classification. I will utilize the presence of these words to help determine an article as positive: orderly, peaceful, negotiate, negotiation, protection, justice, justification, right, rights, grievances, nonthreatening, nonviolent, arbitrate, and arbitration. Then, I will utilize these terms to help categorize an article as negative: invader, invasion, angry, hostile, unproductive, subversive, seditious, incendiary, senseless, disrupt, militant, militancy, insurgent, criminal, crime, battled, sack, sacked, threat, threaten, armed, weapon, attacked, and attack. The presence of these terms will propel the articles in each direction of positive or negative but the further contextual analysis will be

necessary to complete the classification. Now that print media coverage has been adequately operationalized it is imperative to operationalize deterioration.

Deterioration of Alcatraz and the Indian Occupation

Deterioration is the most difficult concept to define within this study because the term is so vague. For the sake of simplicity, I will define deterioration as a decrease in the quality of life. The quality of life will be characterized by three major features like a decrease in living conditions, an increase in social conflict, and the occurrence of tragic events. These features are still very vague and may be difficult to exhibit so the features must be narrowed down to very specific details so that they become visible to the general public. First, it is important to operationalize what sources will be utilized to collect this information.

The deterioration data will be extracted from firsthand accounts and reminiscences of people who participated in the occupation of Alcatraz and spent time on the island. The personal accounts are the best sources to describe the deterioration of the island because they are the people who lived it and they can best describe how life was like and how life changed on the island. The deterioration and the features that will be discussed later will be most evident in the personal accounts because the accounts will describe how things started to become worse for people on the island after the introduction of these features of deterioration. All of the personal accounts will be by Adam Fortunate Eagle, Vine Deloria, Jr., LaNada Boyer (Means), Steve Talbot, Edward D. Castillo, and Tim Findley. Every article is a scholarly source published in the *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* of the University of California, Los Angeles. Although each is a peer-reviewed article, they remain to be adequate data sources because the purpose of their inclusion is to reflect on the occupation of Alcatraz and each author played a significant role in the occupation. It is important to note that each author did not spend the entire

duration of the occupation on the island but this does not discount their testimonies because no Indian spent the entire nineteen months on Alcatraz. Furthermore, each author individually contributed a significant amount of time and effort to the occupation at different times.

Adam Fortunate Eagle, or Adam Nordwall, was one of the initial minds behind the movement to seize Alcatraz for American Indians. He was a prominent leader who formulated the main motivations behind the movement and helped create the initial proclamation of the Indians of All Tribes, the name that the people behind the occupation called themselves (Fortunate Eagle, 44-45). Furthermore, Adam Fortunate Eagle was the man who created the name for the group and was the man who sought out Richard Oakes to be the face of the invasion (Fortunate Eagle, 49). Therefore, Fortunate Eagle is an outstanding personal account because he was present for the inception of the *idea* of the occupation of Alcatraz, the invasion itself, and was there to see what the occupation became. Vine Deloria, Jr. was a major name American Indian legal scholarship at the time and was invited to the island multiple times to discuss possible strategies to approach the U.S. government (Deloria, Jr., 28-29). Deloria, Jr. is also an adequate source because he was very skeptical and critical of the movement and the actions they performed. LaNada Boyer, formerly known as LaNada Means, is an important source because she was one of the main leaders on the island's council after the departure of Richard Oakes. Furthermore, Boyer was not a large supporter of Oakes so her opinion and reflection of the occupation will not be skewed to benefit his image. Talbot and Castillo were less important members of the island but they were both students that participated in the invasion and remained on the island for long periods. Lastly, Tim Findley was not an American Indian or American Indian student but he was a reporter for the San Francisco *Chronicle*, the largest paper in the city at the time. Findley is a significant source because he was responsible for introducing Adam

Fortunate Eagle with Richard Oakes, participated in the initial seizure of the island, was the main reporter that the occupation communicated with, and had such a strong relationship with Fortunate Eagle that the former leader adopted Findley. Therefore, Findley and all of the other recollections of Alcatraz are adequate sources to extract the deterioration data. Now it is important to discuss and disseminate the specifics of the three features that define the quality of life.

It is imperative to clarify the specifics of these three features as specific events that occurred during the duration of the occupation so that people would understand what they are when they view them. The living conditions will be characterized by the separation of access to fresh water and electricity by the government. Throughout the occupation, the Nixon administration curtailed the flow of electricity to the island and subverted any attempts to supply the island with water by blockades. These two commodities represent deterioration and the decrease in quality of life because they are necessary commodities for everyday purposes, such as housing, cleaning, and survival. Electricity is utilized for tasks done through machinery and also needed to generate light which enabled the American Indians to have more time in the day to complete objectives. Water is key to cleanliness which often equates to personal health and it is also necessary to have drinking water to survive. Without these two commodities, it is very difficult for people to maintain a high standard of living which includes less effort to carry out menial tasks and good health.

The second feature of deterioration, the increase in social conflict, will be characterized by the presence of disputes between leadership on the island and disputes between the occupiers and non-occupiers on the direction that the occupation should go. Although this is still somewhat vague, this feature will manifest itself in situations such as the exile of Adam Fortunate Eagle,

one of the original brains behind the operation, and Vine Deloria, Jr., one of the leading legal experts of American Indian scholarship, from the island by the younger activists. This type of example illustrates members of the occupation's inability to cooperate to formulate a cohesive force to maintain the future of the movement. This resembles deterioration because if the leaders and members on Alcatraz are incapable of cooperating as a collective unit, then when problems such as the separation of access to necessary commodities and tragic events occur, which increase the difficulty of surviving exponentially, people will be incapable of figuring out solutions to the problems. If people cannot discover solutions to the problem, then the issues will continue to get worse, which in this case means that the quality of life on the island will continue to worsen. The last feature is arguably the easiest to define and possibly the most important variable for the analysis.

Tragic events will be characterized as sudden events that had a severely negative impact on the emotional and physical status of people and things on the island. For example, an event that harmed emotions for people on the island would be an event that caused severe mourning, such as a death. An example of an event with a negative impact on the physical status of Alcatraz would be an event that destroyed something on the island. These events must have occurred during the time the occupation took place for it to have relevance to the analysis. To narrow the assessment down, I will solely focus on two main incidents for both aspects of the tragic events, which are the death of Yvonne Oakes and the series of fires in June 1970. These two events had dramatic repercussions on the emotional and physical status of the island because Yvonne's death was a highly sorrowful accident and the fires resulted in many buildings that people resided in being destroyed. Now that media coverage and deterioration have been sufficiently operationalized it is imperative to construct how the relationship between them is present.

The Relationship and the Timeline

For the analysis to illustrate how there is a strong relationship between the increase in negative print media coverage and the deterioration of the Alcatraz occupation, I will construct a bi-monthly timeline of the tone of the media coverage and all the major events of the Deterioration school, the Failure to Compromise School, and the Confrontational school. The timeline will be assembled from November 20, 1969, to August 31, 1970, which encompasses the entire duration of the occupation and all of the newspaper articles that we analyzed. The timeline will be bi-monthly because there are many instances in the later points of the occupation that there were no articles at all in some months. Therefore, to illustrate an adequate representation of the tone of media coverage a bi-monthly timeline is necessary. The media portion of the timeline will track the positive media coverage through a line graph that will illustrate the percentages of positive media articles over the total amount of articles released during the time of the occupation. If there is a low percentage of positive media coverage on the timeline, that will conversely exhibit a high percentage of negative media coverage. The line graph that will track the tone of media coverage will expose when the media coverage begins to become more negative, which is imperative for discovering what school of thought is the most accurate.

The events for all three schools of thought will be extracted and formulated using both the news articles and the personal accounts. Both sources are necessary because the personal accounts are approximately thirty years after the time of the occupation which makes it difficult to obtain perfectly accurate dates. The newspapers help narrow the accuracy of the recollections because they reported on many of the events that took place. Therefore, both sources will be

utilized to formulate the most accurate display of events that can be constructed. The events that will characterize the Deterioration school were discussed earlier, such as the death of Yvonne Oakes, the fires, the exile of Adam Fortunate Eagle and Vine Deloria, Jr., and the cut-off of electricity and water to the island by the government. The Failure to Compromise argument's events will include all the proposals of the government to the American Indian activists because the appearance of these proposals suggests the times in which the activists refused the compromises. These are adequate representations even with the absence of media coverage and reminiscences of the refusals because we know from the scholarly articles and other sources that the American Indians never reached an agreement with the government about Alcatraz. The Confrontational school's variables will consist of the events that the occupiers acted violently, such as shooting arrows at boats or were reported to have guns on the island. The Failure to Compromise and Confrontational schools' factors will serve as controls for the analysis when all of the events are placed on the timeline.

When the combination of all events for each school is placed on the timeline with the line-graph of the tone of media coverage, it will be observable which events contributed to the decrease in positive coverage. If the drop in positive media coverage is so drastic and consistent following the introduction of a specific event that falls in one of the three arguments, then that would be sufficient enough evidence to conclude that the specific event may have been a catalyst for the decrease in coverage. If a school of thought's event seems to be the catalyst of the increase in negative media coverage, then it is plausible to attribute the increase of negative media coverage to that argument. One may argue that the media coverage will remain negative and continue to become more negative with the introduction of the other events as well. However, it can also be argued that the media may have not treated the following events

negatively if it were not for the initial catalyst. Therefore, it is sufficient enough to argue that the catalyst is the most significant factor which will tip the debate in the favor of any school the event is characterized by. Now all the terms, variables, and controls have been operationalized it is essential to perform the analysis.

The Catalyst of the Downfall

After the research process of collecting all articles that focused solely on the specific group of people on the island or the concept of the land seizure as a whole, there were a total of 91 articles across all three newspaper sources. **Figure 1** displays the total number of articles collected by each newspaper source and separates them by tone. The percentages exhibited in the table illustrate the percentage of positive and negative articles that were found in each newspaper.

Figure 1: Tone Totals of Newspaper Coverage

	Total (n:91)	Los Angeles Times (n:43)	Chicago Tribune (n:23)	New York Times (n:25)
Positive	37.4%	46.5%	21.7%	36.0%
Negative	62.6%	53.5%	78.3%	64.0%

Newspapers.com and ProQuest

All three newspaper sources were found to be majority negative regarding the occupation of Alcatraz with the *Los Angeles Times* being the least negative and the *Chicago Tribune* being the most negative. The *Los Angeles Times* is the news source closest in proximity to the occupation so it makes sense that it covered the occupation the most and was the most positive of the newspapers. However, it remained to be negative in the majority even though it was the most positive out of all three sources. This table illustrates how the media coverage was primarily

negative but still contained positive coverage. Now it is important to analyze when the coverage was positive and when it was negative.

Figure 2a: Media Coverage Timeline





Figure 2a tracks the tones of media coverage from November 20, 1969, to August 31, 1971. Series1 represents the percentage of positive media coverage and Series2 represents the percentages of negative media coverage for all news sources. At the initial launch of the land seizure, the positive media coverage reached its peak in November and December but immediately dropped to 0% in the following two months. The first two months had the most articles dedicated to the occupation (n=30) compared to all other bimonthly periods. It is also evident that this period was the most positive of the entire duration of the movement which

supports the claim that media coverage was uncharacteristically positive at the beginning of the occupation. November and December 1969 provided the only instance that the positive media coverage broke the 50% ceiling at a high of 77.7%. However, after the initial landing and surge of positive media coverage, all of it collapsed to a dramatic 0% positivity in January and February 1970. After the inaugural surge of positive coverage and sudden drop, the coverage fluctuated for the remainder of the occupation but there are explanations for the spikes in positive coverage.

The first major increase in positive coverage in March and April 1970 can be explained by the fact that it is the first monthly period following the immediate drop in coverage and the authors of the articles. The period is immediately following the dramatic drop to 0% positive media coverage which means there were absolutely no newspaper articles at that time that positively portrayed the occupation. Therefore, it is very simple to have more than zero positive news articles which can explain the increase but it still cannot explain how positive media coverage has a high percentage in this time. The positive coverage in March and April consists of 45.5% which is significant compared to the total for the bimonthly period (n=11). However, some of the positive articles for the period(n=5) are duplicates, the same article published in more than one newspaper, and are written by some of the American Indian occupiers. Therefore, the three articles that fit the previous description must be excluded from

Figure 2b: Adjusted Media Coverage Timeline



the analysis because they unbiasedly skew the data. The exclusion of these articles dramatically adjusts the data but it still does not explain the second spike in positive media coverage examined in September and October 1970.

The statistics gathered for the Sept.-Oct., 1970, the period is insufficient data because of the total amount collected. The months of September and October should be excluded from the analysis because the total amount of articles in the period($n=2$) is insignificant. The percentages of the tones of coverage are so high at 50% each because there is only one for each. The percentages are not adequate representations of the overall data set but this does not mean that they are completely insignificant. Therefore, the data will be absorbed into the previous bimonthly period of July-August, 1970, to illustrate a more accurate representation of the data. Furthermore, it is important to note that January and February 1971 were excluded for similar justifications. There were absolutely no articles collected for these two months for either tone so

this period had to be removed from the timeline because it would have scrambled the data and made the chart more difficult to read.

Figure 2b is the result after addressing all the complications previously stated and when the adjustments have been made. Therefore, **Figure 2b** is the most accurate representation of the timeline of positive media coverage for the occupation. The timeline displays the initial increase and sudden drop in positivity in the first couple of months of the occupation. Then it exhibits how the positivity of coverage never succumbs to the 30% threshold for the remainder of the movement. Furthermore, all covered in the final year of the occupation was negative for all newspaper sources which means that the media did not portray the occupation in a positive light for the entire last year of its existence. Now that the tone of coverage has been adequately documented by **Figure 2b** it is essential to assess which events served as the catalysts of the downfall.

The Confrontational Events

The Confrontational argument suggests that the media coverage turned on the occupation after they began to appear more militant and violent. The militancy and violent behavior are characterized by three events which are the slingshots, Oakes's bar fight, and the shooting of the arrow. The slingshot and arrow events were essentially the American Indians shooting slingshots and arrows at boats passing by. Boyer states that these events occurred because the boats did not listen to the request of the American Indians to stay at least 200 feet away from the island (1994, 85). These events took place on March 22 and August 12, 1970. The third event, Oakes's bar fight, was an event covered in the news articles but attributed to the militant nature of the occupation. The event was a bar fight between Richard Oakes, former leader of the invasion, and a few locals at a bar which happened on June 13, 1970. All of these events took place after the

major drop in positive coverage and did not display dramatic drops after their introduction. Since all of these events occurred in the periods that were already dominantly negative and did not show sudden drops in tone, they cannot be classified as the catalyst of the downfall. Therefore, the Confrontational school is an insufficient argument.

The Failure to Compromise Events

The Failure to Compromise school argues that the occupation lost its favor with the media after their refusals to accept propositions from the government because the media stopped taking the movement seriously. These events are categorized as the two major proposals provided to the island, formulating more appropriate purposes for the island. The American Indians did not accept the proposals because they did not match their original demands and they maintained their stance on their requests. These proposals were recorded to have taken place on April 1 through 9 and May 28, 1970. Similar to Confrontation events, these instances happened after the first collapse in positive coverage and during the time that already were negative. These events also did not exhibit a substantial decrease in positive coverage after their occurrences. Therefore, the Failure to Compromise school is not a sufficient argument.

The Deterioration Argument

The final argument to analyze asserts that the positive media coverage decreased as conditions on the island decreased. The events that characterize the deterioration are the water shortage, the curtail of electricity, the fires, the exclusion of Vine Deloria, Jr. and Adam Fortunate Eagle, Deloria's failed meetings, and the death of Yvonne Oakes. The water shortage and cut off of electricity contributed to the deterioration of the island because they are necessary commodities to maintain a high standard of living but these events occurred on May 30 and August 16, 1970. Both events were documented much later into the occupation which means

they cannot be classified as that catalysts as well. The fires contributed to the deterioration of the island because they destroyed housing for the activists and it injured a handful of people who had no doctor on the island (Boyer, 83). However, the fires took place on the night of June 2 and the morning of June 3, 1970. Thus, the fires were not the catalyst either because they happened much later in the occupation. According to Findley, the removal of Deloria, Jr. and Fortunate Eagle happened after the departure of Richard Oakes (1994, 72-73) which would place the event approximately around early February 1970. This event happened simultaneously to the drop in positive coverage which means that it cannot be classified as the catalyst because the drop was already happening as the event happened. The only events that remain are the failed meetings by Deloria' Jr, and the death of Yvonne Oakes.

According to Deloria, Jr., the meetings that he had with the occupation to discuss the future of the occupation took place on Christmas Eve, 1960, and late January 1970 (1994, 28-29). Deloria asserts that both meetings went poorly because of the inability of the occupation to cooperate (1994, 29). The second meeting in January is not a possible catalyst because it occurred as the drop in positive coverage was happening but the first meeting is plausible. The event happened before the collapse in positivity and illustrated a sudden drop in positivity immediately after its inception. However, the first meeting still is not a catalyst for the downfall because it was not a widely reported event in the news. The event only was made known by the personal account of Vine Deloria, Jr. which is an inadequate source to attribute to the media coverage because he was the only one who covered it and it only appears negative because he was critical of the occupation. Therefore, the meetings are insufficient events to classify as the catalyst which leaves the death of Yvonne Oakes.

The death of Yvonne Oakes, the daughter of the invasion's leader Richard Oakes, occurred between January 6 to 9, 1970. The initial fall from a four-story building that injured her happened on January 6 and she died in intensive care on the ninth. Yvonne's death contributed to the deterioration of the island because it is speculated to have been a murder that was performed by the son of another leader on the island and was the product of a power struggle (Castillo, 119-120). Furthermore, Yvonne's death led to the departure of Richard Oakes, and according to Castillo, the activists were incapable of cooperating after Oakes left the island. Although it occurred in early January, this tragic event serves to be a plausible catalyst of the downfall of media coverage because it was extensively reported across all newspapers, happened before the initial drop, and displayed a significant decrease in positive coverage after the existence of the event. The death of Yvonne Oakes was reported on by all three newspapers and was the first event reported on in January, which is the ignition of the downfall. Before the young girl's death, the media coverage of the occupation was primarily positive but suddenly changed after she passed. After Yvonne died, no media source covered the occupation of Alcatraz as a positive aspect of society. Even the *Los Angeles Times*, which typically reported in the favor of occupation, did not post any positive articles on the occupation. Furthermore, the media coverage never raised above the 30% threshold at any moment after her death. Therefore, Yvonne's death is an adequate event to classify as the catalyst of the downfall of media coverage which supports the Deterioration argument. The Deterioration school is a sufficient argument for the erosion of media coverage because one of the key moments for the argument is the catalyst for the downfall of positive media coverage.

Deterioration and the Erosion of the Media

The death of Yvonne Oakes serves as the main catalyst of the erosion of media coverage which means it is sufficient enough to conclude that the deterioration of the conditions of Alcatraz had the strongest impact in increasing negative media coverage for the occupation. The other two schools did show evidence of affecting negative media coverage but not with a strong enough relationship as the Deterioration school. The construction of the timeline illustrated how Yvonne Oakes's death, one of the major events for the Deterioration school, was the only event covered extensively by all newspaper sources before the sudden collapse and exhibited the most dramatic change in tone after its occurrence. Therefore, Yvonne's death had the most impact on the coverage which means the deterioration had the most impact. This conclusion creates multiple paths for future studies.

Through the course of the analysis, social cohesion appeared to be a significant variable in the increase of deterioration because of the American Indians' inability to cooperate and non-occupiers. It would be interesting to assess what variables affected the decrease in social cohesion on the island. Was it the removal of the original leadership of the invasion? How large of a role did Richard Oakes have in maintaining the cohesion of the occupation? Future research could solve the mysteries of why the deterioration had such a large impact on the occupation and the media.

The occupation of Alcatraz had strong potential at its inception but unfortunately failed to achieve any concrete changes. However, this does not change the significance of the event because of the symbol it is for American Indian activists. It is one of the first events for American Indians that garnered real attention from the public and the government and inspired some of the greatest leaders in American Indian politics. Many of the leaders of the occupation,

such as Adam Fortunate Eagle, Richard Oakes, LaNada Means, Vine Deloria, Jr., Etc. all had prominent careers in American Indian activism and many members of the American Indian Movement (AIM) learned plenty of strategies and focuses from Alcatraz. The legacy the occupation has is very impactful for the American Indian community and led to many advancements for the American Indian people. Without the occupation of Alcatraz, activism for the American Indian community may not be as prominent it is today. So, despite the occupation's flaws, it was a key moment in history and political science that deserves much more study and analysis because of the impact it has had on an ignored and abused group of people in the United States.

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Appendix

Figure 1: Tone Totals of Newspaper Coverage

Figure 2a: Media Coverage Timeline

Figure 2b: Adjusted Media Coverage Timeline

“Comparison of Medieval Just War Theories”

Gavin O’Connor

Introduction

Despite Christian tenets of pacifism, theologians, saints, and canon lawyers in the early and medieval Church have tried to justify Christian war. Two of the most well-known, Sts. Augustine and Thomas of Aquinas were both instrumental to the development of the Just War Doctrine. Along with canon lawyers like Gratian, Huguccio, and Rufinus, they used the Bible and the work of their predecessors to Christian justifications for the existence of and participation in the war.

Each of these authors had differing definitions and requirements for the just war. However, as each subsequent theologian built on the work of their predecessors, certain ideas persisted. Each theory of just war addressed two fundamental concepts: *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. The Latin phrase, *jus ad bellum*, referred to the conditions necessary to wage a war.⁴³ Each author had his criteria to determine conditions under which a war could be justly waged. *Jus in bello* referred to the application of force during the conflict.⁴⁴ Again, each had different criteria for what was permissible in war. These two conceptions gave authors a framework for analyzing the nature of a just war: first, each defined *jus ad bellum*, which allowed a government to declare war, and then *jus in bello* that restricted who could fight and in what ways. This paper will proceed in chronological order to compare and analyze various doctrines of war.

⁴³ Michael Farrell, *Modern Just War Theory: A Guide to Research* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2013), 15.

⁴⁴ J. Daryl Charles, “Presumption against War or Presumption against Injustice?: The Just War Tradition Reconsidered,” in *The Journal of Church and State* 47, no. 2 (2005), 347.

While the main tenets of the Just War Doctrine do not change from Augustine to Aquinas, the details of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* do change. By asking where the theologians made changes and additions to their predecessors' work, it becomes clear that the interaction of non-Christian and Christian kingdoms prompted medieval theologians to redraft their Just War Doctrine.

Augustine

To understand the works of medieval proponents of the just war theory, an analysis of the foundational Christian theologian, St. Augustine, is essential. St. Augustine of Hippo never established a formal doctrine on the just war; rather he alluded to the topic sparingly throughout his works like *The City of God*. As the founder of the Just War Doctrine in Christianity, Augustine could not draw on Christian tradition, so instead, he drew on his contemporary Ambrose and the Roman legalist, Cicero. The focus will be largely on Augustine's theory of just war, though Cicero occasionally appears as a source for Augustine.

Augustine first referred to the theory of the just war as Christianity was becoming more accepted in the Roman Empire. As the Roman Empire became Christian, emperors and soldiers became Christians. Therefore, his focus was not so much on justifying Christian warfare, but rather exonerating Christian soldiers who killed other during the war.⁴⁵ He first explained why war existed: "Every war had peace as its goal, hence war was an instrument of peace and should only be waged to secure peace of some sort."⁴⁶ Wars should result in peace. Augustine said, "The precept 'resist not evil' (Matt. 5:39) did not prohibit wars, for the real danger in soldiering was not military service itself but the malice that so often accompanied it."⁴⁷ He asked soldiers to moderate their use of violence but did not forbid the violence

⁴⁵ John Mark Mattox, *St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War* (London UK: Continuum, 2006), 7.

⁴⁶ Frederick H. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 16.

⁴⁷ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 17.

itself. If the object of war was to create peace, then war was a necessary evil. Augustine exonerated soldiers by declaring only the indulgence of violence was sinful. As long as the soldiers only followed orders, they would not sin.

Augustine then turned to the problem of deciding whether a war was just. Drawing on Cicero's work, he offered the first Christian definition of the just war: "'Iusta bella ulciscuntur iniurias,' just wars avenge injuries."⁴⁸ This simple definition inspired medieval theorists for centuries. In his definition, Augustine defined war as retribution for a previous offense, much as Cicero had a few centuries earlier: "the justification for war is 'limited in its aims of securing redress of grievances and compensation for losses occasioned by crimes of the offending party.'"⁴⁹ While these definitions are similar, Augustine's is more ambiguous and flexible. "For Augustine, 'injuries' refer not only to damages or losses sustained through violation either of national laws or of customarily observed norms... but also for violations of the moral order."⁵⁰ The injuries could be as material or abstract as needed to justify a war, so Augustine's looser definition could make him seem more bellicose than most Romans. Additionally, Augustine saw no difference between offensive and defensive wars.⁵¹ Following Roman tradition, Augustine likely saw all wars as defensive no matter how preemptive they might be in fact. For Romans, the defense of their citizens and property was just cause enough.

While Augustine drew from Roman legal codes, he also used the Bible, specifically the Old Testament, to define just war. The Old Testament presents a significant number of divinely ordered wars: "The Old Testament is replete with examples of instances in which God directs Israel to go to war

⁴⁸ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 18.

⁴⁹ Mattox, *St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War*, 46.

⁵⁰ Mattox, *St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War*, 46.

⁵¹ Mattox, *St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War*, 47.

against other nations... Augustine considers all of these wars to be just by reason of divine decree."⁵² Augustine created another just cause for war: divine decree. Nations, whether Israel or Rome, that acted on God's command did not wage unjust wars because anything from God was just in it and of itself. "A divine decree can be seen as having the effect, for Augustine, of rendering superfluous all of the other *jus ad bellum* criteria; a divine decree could serve either fully to justify or else to mandate participation in war."⁵³ A divine decree overrode any need to justify any war in an era when many believed God frequently spoke directly to people, such a communication sufficed to legitimate war.

Augustine added two requirements to make a war just: right intention and competent authority. "A rightly intended war is one which is 'waged by the good in order that, by bringing under the yoke the unbridled lusts of men, those vices might be abolished which ought, under a just government, to be extirpated or suppressed.'"⁵⁴ The right intention of a just war was to rectify a sin committed against the nation. Augustine's *jus ad bellum* principle of right intention is best understood when compared to the wrong intention, like territorial expansion. "To engage in war with the aim of territorial expansion is not the intention with which a good man goes to war."⁵⁵ A just war needs the right intention which is restitution, not profit. However, Augustine did not prohibit territorial expansion. It was sometimes a consequence of war; added territory could make Rome stronger, safer. So profit could not be the motive of governments, the right intention of war was to correct the sin of the offending nation. Having loosely defined the right intention, Augustine addressed competent authority.

⁵² Mattox, *St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War*, 48.

⁵³ Mattox, *St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War*, 48.

⁵⁴ Mattox, *St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War*, 54.

⁵⁵ Mattox, *St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War*, 54.

All wars divinely decreed were just, but wars not divinely decreed needed competent authority. “For Augustine, it is the sovereign’s position which confers temporal legal authority, including the authority to declare war, and not the degree of the sovereign’s personal righteousness.”⁵⁶ God invested positions, not individuals, with legitimacy. Competent authority was a legal principle, rather than a moral one. Because the sovereign possessed legal authority to wage war, soldiers had a legal obligation to follow orders. Augustine advised, “the soldier as a servant of civic peace to obey even a sacrilegious king and to fight even an unjust war unless the prince ordered deeds that clearly contravened divine precepts.”⁵⁷ If a sovereign waged an unjust war, perhaps by intending to expand territory rather than punish sin, soldiers still had the legal responsibility to fight in the war. Competent authority was not a moral position, but a legal one. Sovereigns could wage wars because God imbued their position with legal authority.

Augustine argued the just war descended from authority. This authority descended from God to the sovereign, who declared the war and finally to the soldiers who executed his orders. It follows that a just war requires soldiers to act justly as they follow orders. “Augustine holds that the taking of human life can find legal and moral justification. He notes, ‘in killing the enemy, the soldier is the agent of the law. Thus, he merely fulfills his duty.’”⁵⁸ The soldier had a duty to obey orders. To kill in a war did not condemn soldiers to hell, but the opposite did. The refusal to obey orders would condemn soldiers. The soldier had a duty to obey orders. Killing in a war did not condemn soldiers, but their refusal to do so would.

⁵⁶ Mattox, *St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War*, 57.

⁵⁷ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 22.

⁵⁸ Mattox, *St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War*, 61.

While Augustine did not lay out specific rules of engagement, he did distinguish the clergy from the laity in war. Augustine designated clergy as non-combatants; not only were they not to be killed or injured, they were not to participate in the war under any circumstances.⁵⁹ Non-combatants could never break engage in combat. Clergy and women and children could not escape their non-combatant status because they were not soldiers and thus had no legal status to fight the enemy.⁶⁰ If they fought, they would not act in be self-defense but rather commit murder.

Augustine did not write a comprehensive just war doctrine but rather alluded here and there to some aspects of its nature. He primarily exonerated Christian soldiers from sins committed during war and justified why war existed. God permitted war, so long as it led to better peace. A just war avenged injury and had a just cause. A divine decree from God was the ultimate justification for war. Authority flowed from God to the sovereign, who had the sole legal right to declare war. If soldiers were just men, they obeyed the sovereign and fought his wars with the right intention; they could not fight because of hatred, bloodlust, or greed, but rather because of love, charity, and the desire to right wrongs. Finally, while soldiers had the legal authority to fight and possibly kill their enemies, non-combatants like the clergy, women, and children, did not have this authority and could not fight under any circumstances. Augustine's theory is unsatisfactory in several ways. It did not clearly outline *jus in bello* principles, beyond a moderation of violence and who had the legal authority to fight in wars. It did not recognize a difference between defensive and offensive wars. Finally, it did not grant the right of self-defense to non-combatants. His successors would address these topics and more.

Gratian and Medieval Canonists

⁵⁹ Mattox, *St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War*, 64.

⁶⁰ Mattox, *St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War*, 64.

Around 1140, Gratian, a Christian monk, composed the *Decretum*, a collection of the past millennium of canon law. Although not the first such compilation, it quickly became the best-known and widely cited collection. In creating the *Decretum*, Gratian referred to many of his predecessors, like Augustine, and incorporated their works into his writings. Between Augustine and Gratian, the political landscape of Europe had changed considerably. The Western Roman Empire had collapsed in the 400s and out of the ruins, came a wide variety of European city-states, kingdoms, and empires. Gratian composed the *Decretum* sometime between the First and Second Crusades when Christian kingdoms fought Muslim caliphates for control of the Holy Land. The need grew to define a just war that could justify the Church's promotion of the Crusades.

Gratian divided the *Decretum* into sections and then *causae*. Each *causa* presented questions that Gratian sought to answer using canon law. In answering the question of "Is military service a sin?" we find the beginnings of his Just War Doctrine: "Gratian asserted that the purposes of military service were to repel injuries and to inflict punishment." Gratian's purpose of military service strongly resembled Augustine's. To answer this question Gratian drew on the texts of the Church Fathers: "Wars waged with benevolent disposition were useful in separating the sinner from the sin. Evangelical precepts did not prohibit all wars, for had this been the case John the Baptist would have advised the Roman soldiers to lay down their arms." Gratian quoted the same Bible examples as Augustine had. John the Baptist told centurions to contend with their wages, but not to lay down their arms. Gratian used this Biblical evidence to conclude that military service was not inherently sinful.

If military service was not inherently sinful, then there must be a situation that justified war. This necessitated the need for a just war. "Peace was the desirable condition, while resort to war must

only be in case of necessity... Thus wars are only licit when they are necessary to return to a peaceful situation.”⁶¹ Again Gratian repeated the argument Augustine had outlined.

A just war aimed to create better peace. However, this position is teleological rather than prescriptive. To craft his definition, Gratian appealed to Cierco, Augustine, and Isidore of Seville. Gratian found three causes of just war, “to repel the invasion; to recover property, and to avenge prior injuries.”⁶² The first two causes are self-explanatory. Repelling an invasion is defensive, and recovering property is retaliation. “To avenger prior injuries” is a catchall for other reasons an authority might deem it necessary to wage war. Gratian proposed three just causes for a just war and then defined a just war. Russell presents Gratian’s definition: “a just war is waged by an authoritative edict to avenge injuries.”⁶³ Gratian used aspects of Augustine’s doctrine and codified the competent authority requirement into the formal definition of a just war. Gratian’s definition did not differ significantly from Augustine’s; his definition included two *jus ad bellum* principles Augustine outlined: just cause and competent authority. “No war could be considered just unless commenced by an authoritative edict; and, even with proper authority, a just war must fulfill the second requirement that it be waged to right a legal wrong or injury.”⁶⁴ Gratian’s definition acted as a formula: competent authority identified a just cause for war and issued an authoritative edict to declare a just war. In his definition, a just war could only be initiated by an “authoritative edict,” although he did not specify what legal document or action constituted an authoritative edict. Gratian did not develop the definition of a just war, beyond what Augustine had already stated.

⁶¹ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 60-61.

⁶² Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 64.

⁶³ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 64.

⁶⁴ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 64.

Gratian determined that military service was not sinful, and clarified aspects of the just war, seeking to determine the correct conduct of a just war. "Only legitimate authorities and soldiers under their command were capable of undertaking a just war."⁶⁵ This echoed Augustine's prescriptions for barring non-combatants from any violent action. The authority for violence rested in the state, which received its authority from God.

While Augustine argued God invested his authority into a sovereign, Gratian added another authority to the hierarchy: The Church. The divine decree became an ecclesiastical decree. "Christians... directed on earth by the Church hierarchy, could legitimately wage war against its invisible enemies."⁶⁶ Gratian lived after the first crusade when the Church had successfully encouraged Christian kingdoms to take back the Holy Land. The Church had political authority in Western Europe, unlike in antiquity when the Church was relatively weak compared to the emperor. In granting the Church the ability to declare a just war, Gratian had to extend two powers: *ius coactivae potestatis* and *executio iuris*. *Ius coactivae potestatis* referred to the indirect authority over war, the power to order persecution.⁶⁷ *Executio iuris* referred to the power to carry out warfare.⁶⁸ Drawing on a millennium of Christian tradition before him, Gratian found the Church had utilized both when convenient. The Church had been drawn into conflict with the Holy Roman Empire during the Investiture Controversy, and cardinals had served during the crusades. However, Pope Gregory the Great and Nicholas I had prohibited bishops from engaging actively in war.⁶⁹ To complicate matters further, some bishops also had regalia, or secular authority, by

⁶⁵ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 69.

⁶⁶ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 73.

⁶⁷ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 76.

⁶⁸ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 76.

⁶⁹ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 76.

their positions as royal vassals. If a king called his vassals to arms, did bishops have to raise armies? Gratian distinguished between bishops with regalia and bishops without. Bishops with regalia had to “accompany the military expeditions of their overlords, provided they had obtained papal consent.”⁷⁰ Where spiritual and secular overlapped, Gratian defaulted to spiritual authority. Gratian concluded the papacy could summon Christians to defend the faith because of its indirect authority; bishops with temporal authority could summon armies for their lord, but not without papal approval. Gratian had to balance the Church’s history of participating in conflicts with its decrees forbidding clerical involvement in warfare.

Living after the Investiture Contest, Gratian had to explain contradictions the Church had made. Gratian claimed the Church possessed both *ius coactivae potestatis* and *executio iuris*.

There was first, the traditional indirect authority, justified by Gregory [the Great] to demand that secular rulers render military defense to the faithful. Second, Gratian asserted that prelates could directly summon any Christian to defend the Church and the faithful against infidels... embedded in this dictum is the claim the Church had the authority directly to wage war.⁷¹

This was a slight departure from tradition. While Gratian had found some instances of the Church utilizing direct authority to wage war, like Pope Leo IV, these instances were in the minority. Because Pope Leo did not have regalia when he allowed prelates to “exhort anyone whomsoever to defend themselves against the adversaries of faith,”⁷² Gratian argued God imbued sacred authorities to wage war. The Church could declare wars, by authoritative anJU edict, but clergy members could not issue

⁷⁰ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 79.

⁷¹ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 80.

⁷² Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 80.

commands that resulted in bloodshed. Thus, Gratian stayed consistent on whether clergy could directly engage in warfare.

Gratian's just war theory was similar to Augustine's theory. Both theories argued war was not inherently sinful. Gratian did not change Augustine's definition of a just war, a just war avenges injuries, but he elaborated on a principle Augustine had mentioned, competent authority. Gratian codified this *jus ad bellum* principle into his definition, a just war is waged by an authoritative edict to avenge injuries. His most significant contribution to the Just War Doctrine was changing the chain of command. While Augustine argued God and the sovereign had the authority to wage war, Gratian injected the Church into the hierarchy. Gratian argued the Church had the authority to declare wars. He also had to define the duties of bishops with regalia. These bishops had to obey their sovereigns by raising armies and accompanying military campaigns, but only with the papacy's approval and they could not actively engage in warfare. This was not an issue when Augustine wrote his theory of the just war. Gratian had to interpret many contradictory positions the Church had taken to address this.

The Decretists

With the creation of the *Decretum* came commentators and canonists, called Decretists, who explored the implications of the *Decretum* in their works. Two of the most notable Decretists were Rufinus (writing in 1157) and Huguccio (writing in 1190). According to Rufinus, "a war was just on three grounds: on account of the one who proclaimed the war; of the one who fought it; and of the one who should be repelled by it."⁷³ The one who commanded the war needed the proper authority and in further agreement with Gratian, he required those who fought to be soldiers. The enemies had to deserve the war." Rufinus did stress the requirement of authority by referring to presumptions of guilt, underlining

⁷³ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 87.

thereby the assumption that a just war was a procedure for legal redress.”⁷⁴ The just war began to leave the realm of a moral theory and enter that of legal theory. Rufinus did not, however, legally define what constituted just cause for the authorization of war.

Huguccio proposed multiple definitions of the just war, but the most useful for determining his position is as follows, “a war was just only if declared by legitimate authority against persons who could legitimately be attacked, and only when both adversaries regarded it to be just.”⁷⁵ Like Rufinus and Gratian, Huguccio stressed the need for the proper authority to wage war. “Against persons who could legitimately be attacked” likely referred to combatants. Thus attacking non-combatants would lead the war to be an unjust one. The last part of his definition almost seemed like the adversaries had to agree the war was necessary. However, Huguccio “denied that one war could be justly waged by both belligerents, for if one justly attacked, the other unjustly defended himself.”⁷⁶ Self-defense was not automatically a just cause for war, especially if the attacker had justification to attack. In the Decretists’ view, one side had just cause, and the other side did not. “The theological basis for this view was the notion of divine punishment for sin through human agency.”⁷⁷ The Decretists assumed that one party possessed the proper authority to punish the offending party. With this respect, Huguccio and Rufinus were similar to Gratian. All argued only proper authority could wage war, but all were lacking in the details of what that proper authority looked like. Other Decretists generally stuck to Gratian’s outline of the just war.

⁷⁴ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 87-88.

⁷⁵ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 89.

⁷⁶ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 91.

⁷⁷ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 92.

The Decretists followed Gratian's arguments for the participation of clergy in war. Both Rufinus and Huguccio prohibited clergy members from taking up military service.⁷⁸ Most Decretists agreed no active clergy members could participate directly in warfare. As for bishops and prelates with regalia, they were encouraged to "contribute their allotment of soldiers to the army, exhort the army to fight a just war, travel with the host, but they must not fight themselves."⁷⁹ On this issue, some Decretists broke with Gratian by omitting any mention of the papal approval that Gratian had argued regalian bishops needed. Huguccio and other decretists argued papal permission was preferable but not necessary for regalian bishops to fulfill their *regnum* duties.⁸⁰ The crucial issue for Gratian and Decretists was not raising armies or supporting a secular authority's war, it was whether the clergy member shed blood.

The Decretists expanded on Gratian's just war theory to address armed conflicts with Muslim caliphates, or as they called them, infidels. "Huguccio justified wars against enemies of the Church on the grounds that they not only offended God by their unbelief but also usurped territories (*sedes*) legitimately held by Christians in accordance with divine law and the *ius gentium*."⁸¹ Huguccio and many other Decretists saw war as punitive. The just side punished the unjust side by waging war on them. Infidels offended not only Christians but also God. This justified an attack on caliphates. Since Muslim caliphates controlled the Holy Land, the Church could justify a war against them. One caveat limiting wars against infidels was the requirement for right authority: "Wars against heretics and other

⁷⁸ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 107.

⁷⁹ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 109.

⁸⁰ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 100-111.

⁸¹ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 114.

enemies of Church and empire required superior authority.”⁸² The same requirements applied to just wars, whether against other Christians or other religions. Of course, Huguccio asserted the papacy and bishops possessed the right authority to wage such a war. Like right authority, the right intention still applied to those who engaged in a war against the Saracens.

Huguccio did not stop with the justifications for the just war. He developed an important theory of the crusades. “Through him the pious wish of the Decretum that whoever died in a war against infidels merited eternal salvation was incorporated into the nascent theory of the crusade.”⁸³ The idea that crusaders would receive salvation for partaking in the crusade emerged from him. Building on the Augustinian idea of a divine decree, Huguccio claimed any holy war was a just war and that those who died fighting in them would enjoy divine salvation.

Contemporary with the development of the just war theory came important counter-theories advocating peace among European kingdoms. Both truces of God and the Peace of God were attempts by the Church to restrain war within Europe. The Truce of God banned fighting and warfare on all Sundays of the year, the twelve days of Christmas, and Holy Week.⁸⁴ This made sense theologically but was unenforceable. In practice, Christians disregarded these strictures, seen most strikingly in the sack of Constantinople on Holy Thursday during the Fourth Crusade sack of Constantinople.⁸⁵ The Truce of God failed to be a proper *jus ad bello*, because it was disregarded by most of Europe. Alternatively, The Peace of God specified classes of people who enjoyed protection as non-combatants. “*De Treuga et Pace*[Of Truces and Peace] lists eight classes of persons who should have full security against the ravages

⁸² Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 118.

⁸³ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 119.

⁸⁴ James Turner Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 124.

⁸⁵ Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*, 125.

of war: clerics, monks, friars, other religious, pilgrims, merchants, and peasants cultivating the soil.”⁸⁶

This canon aligned with Augustine’s ideas regarding non-combatants. Augustine and the Decretists argued only soldiers could participate in war. This list forbade violence against these classes of persons and forbade these persons from waging war themselves. There was a third attempt by the Church to limit violence and war in Europe. In 1139, the Second Lateran Council banned the use of crossbows and siege machines in wars of Christians against Christians, but not in those in which Christians fought infidels.⁸⁷ This was the third instance of *jus in bello*, though it was limited only to Christians fighting Christians. Johnson argues the ban arose as an attempt to limit the use of mercenaries, who were far more likely to use crossbows and siege machines.⁸⁸ This theory is in line with the right intention. Canonists argued men should not take pleasure in war, nor take part for personal gain; a mercenary was thus the exact kind of person canon lawyers sought to ban.

The Decretists followed the example of Gratian and expanded on his work. First, Rufinus and Huguccio echoed the need for the proper authority. They agreed with the *jus ad bellum* principles as first articulated by Augustine. They argued that only governments and the Church could wage just wars and that only soldiers could participate in these wars. As for *jus in bello* characteristics of war, the decretists innovated. Clergy were forbidden from taking up arms, but bishops with regalia could partake in supplying troops to their sovereign, provided the pope allowed it. The Decretists also argued that different *jus ad bellum* rules applied when fighting infidels. By occupying the Holy Land, the Saracens offended all Christians and therefore Christian kingdoms were able to wage just war against them. There were movements to limit warfare, by applying the principle of *jus in bello*. The Truce of God limited

⁸⁶ Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*, 127.

⁸⁷ Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*, 128.

⁸⁸ Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*, 128-129.

when Christians could fight but was largely ignored. The Peace of God forbade the attack against several types of non-combatants, and the Second Lateran Council forbade weapons like crossbows and siege weapons against Christians. These approaches aimed to limit the scope of the war, but these limitations did not apply to infidels (and were largely ineffectual even in Christian Europe).

Aquinas

St. Thomas of Aquinas, a Dominican priest, lived only a few generations after Gratian and the first Decretists. He lived during the later crusades, which had become more and more frequent, but he rarely (if ever) mentioned them.⁸⁹ His Just War Doctrine resembles those of the Gratian and the Decretists. He differed from his predecessors in drawing on Aristotelian philosophy, continuing the trend of the century before in reintroducing Aristotle to the West.⁹⁰ Aquinas was the last major just war theorist discussed because his Just War Doctrine was one of the last formulated.

Thomas of Aquinas' formula for the just war appears simple at first glance: "Thomas in the *Summa Theologica* reduced the concept to three conditions: that a just war be fought on right authority, have a just cause, and be waged with right intention."⁹¹ These concepts, as we have seen, were not new; Aquinas benefited from a huge tradition of just war theory. The right authority and just cause are *jus ad bellum*, defining on what grounds a government could wage war. "Right authority exists where the magistrate is acting (in Paul's words) as 'minister of God to execute his vengeance against the evildoer.'"⁹² Again, God imbued an authority with the power to wage war on his behalf. Most secondary sources give few details regarding which authorities were so empowered. To define a just cause,

⁸⁹ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 294.

⁹⁰ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 258.

⁹¹ Johnson, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War*, 39.

⁹² Johnson, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War*, 39.

Aquinas incorporated Aristotelian philosophy. Aristotle asserted “that man by nature was a social and political animal. Politics then became a practical art whose end was right action, defined as a virtuous community life in which the welfare of the community overrode individual claims.”⁹³ The common good was a type of peace that benefitted a community. Aquinas argued the defense of the common good always stood as a just cause; thus, a just war could be either defensive or offensive, as long as it served that common good.

The last requirement right intention has both a *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* aspect. In terms of *jus ad bellum*, “he defines the concept in Augustine’s own words: ‘The desire for harming, the cruelty of avenging, an unruly and implacable animosity... these are the things which are to be blamed in war.’”⁹⁴ Aquinas took another idea straight from Augustine, namely that love for, not hatred of the enemy that motivated war. Aquinas’ formula is concise, resembles Augustine’s definition, and lists several requirements, much like the Decretists. As with the other theorists, the differences in his theory emerge with an explanation of *jus in bello*.

The right intention did not just carry *jus ad bellum* connotations, it carried *jus ad bello* connotations. In agreement with Augustine, Thomas of Aquinas called for moderating one's behavior in war. “Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to the prosperity of peace.”⁹⁵ Aquinas repeated Augustine’s idea of greater peace. However, the right intention went beyond just the right disposition to war to include the right actions. In particular, Aquinas highlighted military tactics, especially ambushes. “The question of ambushes turned

⁹³ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 261.

⁹⁴ Johnson, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War*, 40.

⁹⁵ Perry Glenn Lovett, “Justifying War: The Just War Tradition Until 1919,” (PhD diss., University of Oklahoma, 1982), 110.

on whether they constituted fraud and were therefore illicit... fraud and breach of promise contradicted the virtues of justice and fidelity, but on the other hand, God had ordered Joshua to lay ambushes.”⁹⁶ The question of ambushes presented a new problem in citing Scripture; if ambushes were unvirtuous, how could God have instructed the Israelites to use them Aquinas resolved this issue by arguing, “since in Christian doctrine many things were hidden, especially from infidels lest they scorn such things, preparations for attack could be hidden from enemies.”⁹⁷ Aquinas thus justified their use against infidels. *Jus in bello* mostly applied to Christians, not infidels or pagans. Aquinas also objected to the Truce of God, and argued the Maccabees had fought on feast days thereby prioritizing the common good over religious observance.⁹⁸ Aquinas used a formula to object to detractors. First, he appealed to the Bible for counterexamples and then he referred to Aristotelian philosophy to bolster his argument. In some ways, Aquinas was only justifying reality because The Truce of God had been largely disregarded by theorists and armies alike. Instead, he argued, “When a war was just because it was necessary, then logically it should be fought by any means and at all times.”⁹⁹

Aquinas wrote on several topics of the conduct of war, most of which had been touched on by his predecessors, including clerical participation in the just war. Aquinas agreed with the Decretists that the clergy could not engage in active warfare or bloodshed. “Clerics were prohibited from warfare because such an activity inhibited contemplation, praise of God and prayer, and also because the ministry of the altar was incompatible with killing.”¹⁰⁰ By their position, Aquinas argued the clergy could not shed blood

⁹⁶ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 271.

⁹⁷ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 271.

⁹⁸ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 272.

⁹⁹ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 272.

¹⁰⁰ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 282.

without mortally sinning; this prohibition extended to prelates with regalia. “Even prelates with temporal authority were not to participate personally in punishments involving bloodshed but should delegate the exercise of these duties to a subordinate official unencumbered by clerical status.”¹⁰¹ Aquinas did not allow any exceptions to bishops with regalia. This position was not new, as Aquinas remained firmly in line with Gratian.

The larger issue of clerical participation turned on whether the Church could authorize wars. To justify the Church’s involvement in the crusades and earlier conflicts, like the Investiture Controversy, Aquinas examined the Old Testament. He argued that war was a punishment for sin. Just as the Israelites could persecute their enemies, so too could the Church “wage war on evil men to avoid greater evils and to foster greater goods.”¹⁰² The Church participated in wars because it had the power to punish the sins of its adversaries. Therefore, the crusades punished infidels for their sins of blasphemy and idolatry. Aquinas maintained that the Church possessed indirect authority over war, as Gratian had first stated. In wars against other religions, the Church possessed more power to wage war. “He stated flatly that the Church had the right to abolish such infidel dominion because infidels by the very fact of their infidelity deserved to lose their power over the faithful.”¹⁰³ In opposition to Huguccio, who had argued that infidels’ control of Christian lands (i.e. the Holy Lands) justified for war, Aquinas argued infidels and their infidelity warranted punitive war. Aquinas presented a more extreme justification for war against the Saracens.

Aquinas’ principles of proper authority and just cause in his Just War Doctrine primarily served to justify offensive wars, which needed special rationales. “Using enough force to ward off an (unjust)

¹⁰¹ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 282.

¹⁰² Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 283.

¹⁰³ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 286.

attack necessitates no special appeal to legitimate authority... Only when initiative is taken to use lethal force for the repression of wrongdoing... does legitimate authority become a necessary (although not a sufficient) condition."¹⁰⁴ Repulsion of an unjust attack does not require proper authority but taking the offensive did. In general, modern scholars do not elaborate on who Aquinas thought had proper authority. Russell used the term prince throughout his chapter on Aquinas, while Reichberg did not specify any titles. It is reasonable to infer that Aquinas allowed Christian kingdoms to wage offensive war, and sought to justify the Church's involvement in these wars. As for just cause, Aquinas is often as vague as he was regarding proper authority: "For he did not mention any more specific crime such as invasion or seizure of property. The general category of prior guilt seemed so sufficiently clear to him that defense of the common good or community against any wrongful act could be subsumed under the general criterion."¹⁰⁵ The defense of the common good was the only just cause but Aquinas did not present any legal definition of what this might be. As a theologian, Aquinas naturally focused on a moral rather than legal theory of the just war theory.

Overall, Aquinas did not propose major changes to the just war theory in regards to *jus ad bellum*. His definition of just war included the three criteria: right authority, just cause, and right intention, none of which was new. Aquinas borrowed heavily from his fellow theologian, Augustine. Gratian and the Decretists repeated these criteria. Proper authority and just cause were *jus ad bellum* principles. As seen, the authors of just war theory do not change the principles themselves but change some of the details. Where Gratian and the Decretists focused on the legal theory of proper authority, Aquinas emphasized the moral theory of just cause in connection to Aristotle's common good. The defense of the common good afforded the right authority to wage either a defensive or offensive war.

¹⁰⁴ Henrik Syse and Gregory M. Reichberg, eds., *Ethics, Nationalism, and Just War: Medieval and Contemporary Perspectives* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 75.

¹⁰⁵ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 269.

Aquinas' right intention referred both to the intention one goes to war and the conduct of one in war. Similar to Augustine, one went to war to rectify transgressions, and out of love of the enemy. Aquinas echoed the desire for soldiers to moderate their bloodlust. Aquinas' addition to the right intention was the discussion of specific military tactics, like ambushes. Christians could not use ambushes against Christians but could use deceptive tactics against infidels. Aquinas applied stricter *jus in bello* principles to Christians when fighting Christians than when fighting infidels. The Decretists had similar views and applied *jus in bello* to Christians, not infidels. Aquinas had more extreme views than Huguccio, and argued infidels by their unbelief constituted a just cause to wage war against them. Huguccio had argued their ownership of the Holy Lands prompted just war. Aquinas agreed with Gratian and the Decretists that the Church had the authority to call Christian armies to war, as long as the clergy were not directly responsible for the bloodshed. Bishops with regalia had a duty to raise armies and march with their sovereign. Aquinas made additions to *jus in bello* when Christians fought infidels. Looser *jus in bello* principles allowed Christians to engage in fiercer tactics against infidel kingdoms. Beyond this addition, Aquinas benefited from the work of his predecessors.

Conclusion

Augustine did not write a comprehensive Just War Doctrine, but the ideas he created persisted in medieval theories. Augustine wrote, the just war avenged injuries.¹⁰⁶ This implied a just war rectified transgression. Augustine laid the groundwork for the *jus ad bellum* principles of just war. A just war needed a just cause, competent authority waged the war, and those who fought had to have the right intention. These ideas persisted into Gratian's definition, "a just war is waged by an authoritative edict to avenge injuries,"¹⁰⁷ and into Aquinas' formula: "a just war be fought on right authority, have a just

¹⁰⁶ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 18.

¹⁰⁷ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 64.

cause, and be waged with right intention.”¹⁰⁸ *Jus ad bellum* did not deviate from the framework Augustine started. Rufinus and Huguccio worded their definitions differently, but the criteria remained the same. Rufinus defined the just war as “just on three grounds: on account of the one who proclaimed the war; of the one who fought it; and of the one who should be repelled by it.”¹⁰⁹ Huguccio defined the just war as “just only if declared by legitimate authority against persons who could legitimately be attacked, and only when both adversaries regarded it to be just.”¹¹⁰ The Decretists emphasized the need for proper authority to declare war in response to a just cause.

Just War Doctrines deviate from Augustine in their application of *jus in bello* principles. Augustine’s right intention referred to the intention of the government declaring war and the intentions with which soldiers fought in the war. Augustine advocated for the moderation of violence, calling it a necessary evil. War was not a sin, but excessive violence was. He also defined non-combatants as those without the legal authority to take a life. Thus clergy, women, and children were not to kill and violate their non-combatant status. Augustine was sparse on his *jus in bello* principles which allowed his successors to expand the scope of *jus in bello*.

Gratian, the Decretists, and Aquinas all had to wrestle with clerical participation in the war. As the Church took a greater involvement in warfare, canonists and theologians had to justify the Church’s actions. Gratian argued the Church possessed the power to call Christian kingdoms to war, and the Decretists upheld this belief. Gratian addressed the issue of bishops with regalia. These bishops, as royal vassals, had an obligation to raise armies for their sovereign and accompany military expeditions. Gratian argued they could perform these duties, provided they did not directly order military commands

¹⁰⁸ Johnson, *Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War*, 39.

¹⁰⁹ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 87.

¹¹⁰ Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages*, 89.

and as long as the papacy approved. Again, the Decretists did not deviate from Gratian's model, but some did question if these bishops needed approval from the papacy. Aquinas agreed that the Church could declare wars, again provided no clergy participated in direct military involvement. However, as a theologian, Aquinas justified his approach not legalistically but theologically. The Church had the power to punish sinners, specifically infidels.

The largest addition to the Just War Doctrine, by the Decretists and Aquinas, was the problem infidels posed to Christianity. The Decretists and Aquinas advocated for looser *jus in bello* principles when Christians engaged infidels. Huguccio argued wars were punitive, as such the Church had a duty to punish infidels for their sins. Counter-theories of peace also did not generally apply to infidels. The Truce of God prohibited Christians from fighting on Holy days, but almost all Christians ignored this. The Peace of God defined non-combatants. The Second Lateran Council forbade the use of crossbows and siege machines against Christians, not against infidels. The Church tried to establish rules of conduct to Christians but did not apply the same principles against infidels. Aquinas argued specific tactics, like ambushes, were fine to use against infidels, but not Christians. For Aquinas, the unbelief of infidels was just cause to declare war. The principles of just war became looser as Christians interacted with the Muslim caliphates. Augustine wrote before the establishment of Islam and did not envision the conflict of the crusades. Gratian wrote after the first crusade and worked to justify why the Church could declare this war. The Decretists and Aquinas wrote during the later crusades and repeated interaction with infidels necessitated revisions to the just war theory.

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Section 3

Politics

"Putin's Illiberal Solution to his Nationalist Battles"

Erin Fenzel

When Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999, he faced a country in shambles: Russian citizens were living in poverty at unprecedented rates, the government was on the brink of collapse, and Putin had been given the task of "fixing" Russia. There were few ways Putin could begin to fix Russia without first establishing what he envisioned Russia to be. Putin's rebranding of Russian ideals and statehood was an attempt to move past the failings of the Soviet Union and the failed attempts to democratize Russia. This movement was largely successful for the early 2000s, but Russia retains many of the same economic and political problems it had in 1999, causing some Russian citizens to question the legitimacy of Putin. Similar to many other nations, Russia has experienced a rise in nationalism in ways that overreach Putin's form of patriotism. Putin identifies with parts of the Russian nationalist movement because of his longstanding belief that the nation is the core of the state. But because the majority of the nationalist movement is based on Russian ethnicity, this threatens Putin's legitimacy and the maintenance of the multiethnic state of Russia. Thus, Putin has had to alter his political strategy by embracing illiberalism to protect his authority.

To understand how Putin identifies with the nationalist movement within Russia, one must first understand how Putin views the role of the nation. Vladimir Putin started his presidency off with his "Russia at the Turn of the Millennium Message" to unite the people of Russia around each other and him as a relatively unknown leader. In this speech, Putin described how great Russia could truly be if people united around basic issues that could help establish "social accord," or unity within Russia. The three basic issues that Putin believes can unite Russians are statism, belief in the greatness of Russia, and social solidarity. Authors of *Mr. Putin*, Fiona Hill, and Clifford Gaddy, explain the similarities between

Putin's ideas in the Millennium Message and the centuries-old Uvarov Doctrine of Orthodoxy, Nationality, and Autocracy.¹¹¹ This doctrine was first established in 1833 to unite Russians under the tsarist regime, but Putin found that the same formula could work to unite Russia in 1999. Putin believed that the “social accord” could unite the Russian people because everyone could “accept supra-national universal values which are above social, group or ethnic interests”¹¹² thus enabling greater harmony in multiethnic Russia. This acceptance of all other ethnic identities in Russia is put into a singular term, “narod”, which means the “people” of Russia that Putin believes he can relate to as well as speak for to unite the country.¹¹³ When Putin declares this plan for creating unity in Russia, he is taking direct responsibility for the wellbeing of Russia.

The idea of “narod” is possible only when it is understood who or what is not included in the grouping. Luckily for Putin, a common enemy or “other” was created in the early days of his presidency: Chechnya. Two years after the first war with Chechnya ended in 1996, a horrific series of apartment bombings throughout Russia were blamed on Chechen insurgents which warranted the second invasion of Chechnya that would last for the next decade. It is important to note that Chechnya is a part of Russia, but they are the “other” because the Chechens were not ethnic Russians, committed the bombings, and fought for independence from Russia. Therefore, they do not belong with the “narod” and the ideals that true Russians should possess. Putin garnered support for his condemnation of

¹¹¹ Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy. *Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin*. (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 64

¹¹² Vladimir Putin, “Russia at the Turn of the Millenium,” Putin on RUSSIA & MILLENNIUM, 1999, <https://pages.uoregon.edu/kimball/Putin.htm>.

¹¹³ Hill and Gaddy, *Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin*, 69

Chechen rebels when he said “We’ll catch them in the toilet. We’ll wipe them out in the outhouse.”¹¹⁴

The strong language that Putin used to denounce the insurgents demonstrated to Russians that he would be personally responsible for finding those who carried out these attacks and also that true Russians would be protected from anyone who tried to attack them. Not only did this war unify Russians around the common identity that Putin wanted, but it also demonstrated his ability to protect Russia and its citizens, creating an image as a sort of fatherly, protective figure that Putin would come to embrace. Utilizing this form of nationalism, by creating an “other” and instilling pride in the state of Russia was essential for Putin to legitimize his rule. As demonstrated throughout his time as president, Putin’s legitimization method is utilized when other forms of credibility, like the economy doing well, are not available and remains crucial to his continued reign as he has inextricably linked his ability to lead with Russia’s power.

The early 2000s were advantageous to Russia (and Putin's authority) as the economy prospered and stability to Russians' everyday life was restored. During this time, the economy became the main source of legitimacy for Putin and he switched positions with his Prime Minister, Demetri Medvedev, in 2008 under the constitution. However, during this period, the world including Russia began to see a shift in ideology and a desire for expanding freedoms.

Putin’s decision to return as president of Russia in September of 2011 came at a period of increasing economic uncertainty with the new European debt crisis and the “Arab Spring” uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. The response to Putin’s presidency announcement was marked with uncertainty as questions over his intentions sparked uneasiness. The head of the People’s Freedom Party, Boris Nemtsov, described Putin’s decision to run again as "the worst possible scenario for the development of

¹¹⁴ Mike Eckel, “Two Decades On, Smoldering Questions About The Russian President's Vault To Power.” *Radio Free Europe Radio Library*, August 7, 2019

my country"¹¹⁵ and these concerns manifested in large protests in Moscow demanding fair elections. In addition to protesting the undemocratic process in Russia, these protests also marked a change in extreme nationalism in Russia. During these protests, calls to "stop feeding the Caucasus" were made to stop subsidies to Chechnya and other North Caucasus republics after many of these republics became dependent on Moscow due to the devastating wars and counterinsurgency operations.¹¹⁶ These protests proved problematic for Vladimir Putin in two ways: for the first time, his authority and right to rule were challenged, and his vision of the multiethnic nation, the "narod," was being criticized.

To fix the first problem, those who questioned his authority, Putin took strong action by very publicly arresting the prominent leaders of the protests which established an expectation for what would happen to those who went against him and therefore against Russia. The calls for separation were not quite as easily fixed and prove troublesome today; Putin essentially created the sentiment that Chechens and those in the North Caucasus regions were "others" but also made them financially dependent on Russia. The state-run television network, Russia Today, reported on Putin's response to these calls of separatism: "Those who say so deserve to have a piece of themselves cut off... They do not understand what they are talking about. As soon as any country starts to reject some problematic territories, this means the beginning of the end for the whole country."¹¹⁷ While Putin inadvertently created this divide in Russian society, he understood the risk that calls for separatism can have on the overall authority of Russia and himself; he created an image of himself as a champion for Russian unity,

¹¹⁵ RFE/RLE. "Putin Announces Presidential Bid, With Medvedev Backing." *Radio Free Europe Radio Library*, September 24, 2011

¹¹⁶ Hill and Gaddy, *Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin*, 94

¹¹⁷ Russia Today. "Nationalists Demand Moscow 'Stop Feeding the Caucasus.'" *Russia Today*, September 29, 2011

which he linked to Russian strength. If Russia was unable to keep control of its territories and people, how could it be respected on an international scale?

The increasing responses of white, Christian Russians to push out Russian Muslims in the Caucasus poses additional significant trouble for Putin as he prides himself on his ability on keeping Russia unified when earlier leaders failed to do so. The 2011 protests marked a change in Russia and enabled the nationalist movement of ethnic Russians to become much more prominent. In the first chapter of *Russia Before and After Crimea: Nationalism and Identity 2010-2017*, Emil Pain explains the shift that these protests had on the nationalist movement in Russia: “by 2010, the situation had changed radically and the Russian nationalists proposed a new idea: ‘Nationalism and democracy are practically the same thing.’”¹¹⁸ Pain explains that the new form of nationalism emerged as a problem for Putin as the nationalist parties had created true legitimacy and could truly challenge him. Before the 2011 protests, the different nationalist parties that existed—the National Democratic Party, the National Socialist Initiative, the Slavic Union, and the New Force party—differed in their beliefs concerning issues such as immigration and rights for ethnic Russians. Putin saw an opportunity to silence their criticism as these groups became more unified in their beliefs by finding something that could satisfy their demands. The opportunity to silence this new form of nationalism presented itself in Ukraine.

The Orange Revolution that took place in Ukraine in 2004 created a growing sentiment of moving Ukraine into a more pro-Europe stance. Serhii Plokhi, Professor of History at the University of Alberta, explained the effects of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine: “At least one of the ideological

¹¹⁸ Emil Pain. "Contemporary Russian Nationalism in the Historical Struggle between 'official Nationality' and 'popular Sovereignty'." In *Russia Before and After Crimea: Nationalism and Identity, 2010–17*, ed. by Kolstø Pål and Blakkisrud Helge. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), 37

impulses...was the idea that Ukraine should be part of Europe,"¹¹⁹ which would be through the form of partnership with the European Union (EU). This increased desire to join Europe and join the EU posed a threat for Putin as he viewed EU membership as a direct threat to Russia's relationship with Ukraine, which would make him, and Russia look weaker on the international stage. This belief of Putin's led him to prevent Ukraine's joining the EU, which was not necessarily difficult as Russia had very strong and tangible ties to Ukraine. Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk explain Ukraine and Russia's economic ties: "Ukraine's...manufacturing, which was highly energy-intensive, was powered almost exclusively by Russian gas [and] Russia was heavily dependent on Ukraine's gas pipelines to transport hydrocarbons to customers further west."¹²⁰ Ukraine's dependency on Russia for most of its energy resources put Ukraine in a very precarious situation when trying to navigate joining the European Union, prolonging its agreement talks until 2013. In November 2013, Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov halted the Association Agreement with the EU a week before it was scheduled to be signed to "fully analyze the impact of the planned agreement on industrial production and trade with Russia"¹²¹ after Russia threatened to restrict trade with Ukraine. Displeased with this decision, demonstrations broke out in Kiev protesting the corrupt government, known as the Maiden Revolution. In addition to Putin's success in keeping Ukraine out of the EU and thereby weakening his power, he also took the opportunity to stifle the new pro-democracy nationalism that had recently taken hold in Russia by annexing Crimea from Ukraine.

¹¹⁹ Renata Kosci-Harmatiy, "Ukraine's Quest for Europe: History, Geography, Identity," (Wilson Center, 2005)

¹²⁰ Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk. "Between Dependence and Integration: Ukraine's Relations With Russia." (*Europe-Asia Studies*, 2016), 680

¹²¹ RFE/RLE Ukrainian Service, "After Kyiv Snub, Kwasniewski Says EU-Ukraine Deal Is Off." *Radio Free Europe Radio Library*, November 21, 2013

An autonomous part of Ukraine and on the border of Russia, Crimea was in a vulnerable geographical position, complicated by the cultural and ethnic makeup of Crimea itself. Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Center explained the unique demographics of Crimea: “Its population of nearly 2 million is about 60 percent Russian, many of whom are retired Russian military personnel...only 24 percent of whom are ethnic Ukrainians, have seen themselves as a breed apart from the Ukrainian mainstream.”¹²² With such a large population that identifies as Russian and mainly speaks Russian, Putin saw Crimea as an easy target to garner public support within Russia, and to demonstrate to the outside world how far he was willing to go to protect Russian interests. Compounded with a referendum in which 96% of Crimean voters supported returning to Russia (a highly inflated number¹²³) and the placement of Russian soldiers in Crimea, there was no real way for Ukraine to reject the annexation without beginning a war with Russia.

In Putin’s address to the nation in March of 2014, he explained the importance of why the annexation had to happen as soon as it did: “Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes, and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day.”¹²⁴ Putin's claims that anti-Semitism was rampant and one of the primary reasons for his quick response with Crimea was false according to the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine who responded by saying Putin's assertions "did not match reality [and] might have confused Ukraine with Russia where Jewish organizations registered a rise of anti-Semitism last year.”¹²⁵ Putin's blatantly false statements

¹²² Dmitri Trenin and Andrew Weiss, “Keep a Lid on Crimea,” Carnegie Moscow Center (Carnegie Moscow Center, February 27, 2014)

¹²³ Timothy Snyder. *The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America*. (Tim Duggan Books, 2018), 117

¹²⁴ The Kremlin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation,” (President of Russia, March 18, 2014)

¹²⁵ Stephen Ennis and Masha Kondrachuk, "BBC News," *BBC News* (BBC Monitoring, November 12, 2014)

support the conclusion that his entire purpose in invading Crimea was solely for political gain, not out of concern for the fair treatment of Jews or the residents of Crimea. This narrative of the annexation of Crimea as a way to preserve the diversity of Crimea was continued in his address when he stated, “Crimea is a unique blend of different people’s cultures and traditions. This makes it similar to Russia as a whole, where not a single ethnic group has been lost over the centuries.”¹²⁶ In both statements in his speech, Putin not only asserted himself as the savior of Crimea but also denounced any claims that Russian nationalism was the primary reason for this nationalist, offensive move.

The annexation provided three advantages for Putin: he was able to provide Russian citizens with pride in the state, satisfy some demands from Russian nationalists, and put NATO and the West in its place—out of Russia and its former territories. With essentially no real action from NATO and its allies condemning the annexation besides economic sanctions,¹²⁷ Putin established Russia as a force to be reckoned with in the international scene—returning it to what it was in the Cold War. This return in a fight for world hegemony allowed Russian citizens to appreciate Putin and his leadership, providing another source of legitimacy for Putin. Putin’s approval during this time was demonstrated both in public opinion polls where his approval rating rose from 69% in February of 2014 to 80% in March of 2014,¹²⁸ and in the silencing of Putin’s nationalist political opponents. Emil Pain demonstrates the change in nationalist party members’ sentiment after the annexation:

[Yegor] Prosvirnin [a prominent Russian nationalist], who until then had directed caustic criticism at the Russian authorities, now made no secret of his support for the government’s

¹²⁶ The Kremlin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation,” (President of Russia, March 18, 2014)

¹²⁷ Karen DeYoung, “Russia Has Withdrawn Most Troops from Ukraine Border, Hagel Says,” *Washington Post*, May 30, 2014

¹²⁸ “Levada Russia Ratings.” Levada-Center, 2020. <https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/>.

actions during the Crimean crisis...He commented on his change of position...on his website: And the fact that Putin, after decades of surrendering Russian interests everywhere and in every way, suddenly remembered that Crimea is Russian land, is good...It would be strange, to say the least, to criticize Putin for having begun to fulfill a part of our programme.¹²⁹

While the annexation of Crimea did somewhat silence Putin's opponents, it also allowed for a more general nationalist sentiment to take hold within Russian society—one that Putin has had to reckon with for the foreseeable future.

Putin's annexation of Crimea silenced his nationalist opponents for some time. In the eighth chapter of *Russia Before and After Crimea: Nationalism and Identity 2010-2017*, Sofia Tipaldou explains how the annexation of Crimea brought a period of confusion to the different nationalist movements who were pleased with the annexation of Crimea, which left them struggling to come up with a plan to criticize Putin.¹³⁰ The lack of unity in the different nationalist parties allowed Putin to guide nationalist sentiment for a while. As stated previously, the idea of "narod" was still very much prevalent, but now also included a true Russian being inherently anti-Western and rejecting many "Western" views, such as homosexuality and feminism. These traditional beliefs allowed for Putin to control the nationalist narrative and switch the attention from ethnic and religious concerns to more social beliefs that most of Russia was in support of.

¹²⁹ Emil Pain. "Contemporary Russian Nationalism in the Historical Struggle between 'official Nationality' and 'popular Sovereignty'." In *Russia Before and After Crimea: Nationalism and Identity, 2010-17*, ed. by Kolstø Pål and Blakkisrud Helge. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), 38

¹³⁰ Sofia Tipaldou. "The extreme right fringe of Russian nationalism and the Ukraine conflict: The National Socialist Initiative." In *Russia Before and After Crimea: Nationalism and Identity, 2010-17*, ed. by Kolstø Pål and Blakkisrud Helge. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), 201

This new nationalist narrative has been demonstrated through Putin's close relationships with the motorcycle gang the Night Wolves and the anti-liberal association known as the Izborsky Club. The Night Wolves formed in the late 1990s but have risen to prominence with Putin's fondness for them. Peter Poerantsev explains that the Night Wolves became an important part of Putin's circle because "The Kremlin needs the bikers and movements like them. The things Russia's dictatorship once depended on to give it an air of legitimacy – its cheerleaders and its fake opposition, the pro-Putin youth groups and tame political parties – no longer hold sway the way they did."¹³¹ The Night Wolves support Putin's version of a strong, masculine leader, his traditional values, and his patriotic beliefs. The leader of the Night Wolves, Alexei Weitz, emphasized how important the Russian state is by stating "Democracy is a fallen state... In the kingdom of God there is only above and below. All is one. Which is why the Russian soul is holy. It can unite everything."¹³² Putin has capitalized on the agreement of the Night Wolves and Putin's political beliefs by having them serve as a sort of unofficial Kremlin representative in areas that Putin believes need Russian presence (e.g. Crimea before the annexation in February 2014 and most recently in Belarus in 2016.¹³³) The Izborsky Club is a lesser form of Putin's propaganda as they have been more critical of Putin and some of his political decisions than the Night Wolves, but represent a sort of the change in anti-liberalism sentiment that has become a defining characteristic of Russia in recent years. Marlene Laruelle explains the Club's central ideas: "Anti-liberal would probably be a more pertinent designation because the doctrinal core that unites the Club's many internal trends is a rejection of liberalism in all its forms—political, moral, and economic. This antiliberal

¹³¹ Peter Pomerantsev. "Forms of Delirium." *London Review of Books* (October 10, 2013).

¹³² Timothy Snyder. *The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America*. (Tim Duggan Books, 2018),116

¹³³ RFE/RL. "Night Wolves Arrive In Bratislava As Journey Toward Berlin Continues." *Radio Free Europe Radio Library*, May 4, 2016.

tone comes with a narrative on Russia's uniqueness, hence the overlap with nationalism."¹³⁴ The Club's rejection of liberalism and belief that Russia remains the sole entity for fixing the wrongs that come with liberalism place the Izborsky Club as a controllable nationalist group that aligns with Putin's nationalist ideals. These two groups are just two examples of Putin's practical attempts to subvert the nationalist narrative after the Crimean invasion and as part of his new political and foreign policy strategy of illiberalism for other countries.

Putin's new policy of illiberalism is a tool he created to dispel ethnic tensions within Russia and instead focus on disrupting other countries' liberal order. Laruelle defines Russia's illiberalism as the denouncement of political, economic, and social liberalism that is demonstrated through globalization and multiculturalism.¹³⁵ This new focus of Putin manifests itself within Russia in denouncing liberalism and denying certain rights for its citizens and in amplifying illiberal ideas in other countries. This new strategy allows Putin to shift the focus from issues of subsidies given to the Caucus republics to which countries and outside groups are possible threats to the state of Russia. With this new thinking, Putin has been able to protect himself in terms of questions concerning his legitimacy as a leader, but his strategy is vulnerable to the actions of other countries. The problems with this strategy are already visible with the current COVID-19 pandemic and the lack of a strong, unified response from Putin in protecting Russian citizens. Although the new amendment allowing for Putin's extension as President has passed this past year, his approval ratings hover around 60%, the lowest since Putin has taken office.¹³⁶ His low approval ratings, an increase in unemployment, and Russia's poor response to the

¹³⁴ Marlene Laruelle. "The Izborsky Club, or the New Conservative Avant-Garde in Russia." *The Russian Review*. (2016), 629

¹³⁵ Marlen Laruelle. . "Making Sense of Russia's Illiberalism." *Journal of Democracy* (2020), 115

¹³⁶ "Levada Russia Ratings." Levada-Center, 2020. <https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/>.

coronavirus leave Putin vulnerable to questions of his legitimacy, which a focus on illiberalism alone will be unable to fix.

If one follows the patterns of Putin and his attempts to diminish questions of his authority, one would anticipate some kind of an invasion or other extreme action in the near future to unify the Russian people behind him and support his endeavors to “protect” Russia and its identity. After Chechnya and Crimea, there is the question of where Putin will go next; where else is Putin able to declare foul play and justify to the Russian people his invasion? If one were to look at the Night Wolves for an indicator of where Putin is eyeing next, Belarus and Poland could be considered the next targets as the Night Wolves visited them, but those could leave Putin exposed to a counterattack by NATO. By annexing Crimea in 2014, Putin quieted his nationalist opposition, but current events have left him with few choices in how he can continue to maintain his hold on the country.

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“The Fight for Fair Labor”

Noah Pingul

When the 32nd President of the United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, entered into office, America was in the midst of the largest economic depression in modern history which affected all corners of the globe (Pells). There were thousands of people unemployed with no good way to earn a living wage (Mcelavin). Desperate and angry, Americans lost faith in the banks, the government, and the President (Anonymous). Newly elected President Roosevelt began to rebuild the crumbling nation (New Deal). Slowly he and his cabinet, with new ideas for the American economy, began to regain the trust of the American people (Riggs). During his first term in the late 1930s, Roosevelt set his sights on a bill that would create a minimum wage and a maximum number of hours of work in a week that would raise the living standards for American families (Roosevelt). This new bill would be called the Fair Labor Standards Act. While imperfect, the Fair Labor Standard Labor Act of 1938 created the basis for a minimum standard of living for Americans and came at a time in American history where most people struggled economically to survive.

Unexpectedly, a massive depression shocked America in the late '20s; and it cost hundreds of thousands of hardworking Americans their jobs. President Herbert Hoover, who was President from 1929-1933 during the beginning of the Depression, lacked interest in dealing with the crisis that was crippling America. The Depression had no singular cause. However, it is often attributed to economic issues that piled up, with the Stock Market Crash of 1929 being the last step that began the downward economic spiral into the Great Depression (Pells). The Stock

Market crashed on October 29, 1929, a day that would later be called Black Tuesday, when 16 million shares were traded and lost value, devastating Wall Street and the banks (Carson). Before the crash, many people saw the Stock Market as a quick and easy way to make a fortune, but many investors wanted more money for bigger profits. Investors turned to the banks to boost their investments by applying for loans from the banks, which they then invested in stocks, with the collateral being the stocks themselves (Pells). Most investors anticipated a profit but did not adequately consider the riskiness of this strategy. When the Stock Market crashed, Americans were unable to pay off their loans to the banks, which meant the banks lost billions of dollars. This caused hundreds of banks across the country to close, which resulted in the closure of nearly 100,000 businesses, furthering the economic distress for millions (Carson). The unemployment rate soared and many Americans lost homes to the depression. Business owners took advantage of needy and desperate workers by increasing the number of working hours in a week, while at the same time decreasing wages. Desperate people accepted these conditions. President Herbert Hoover was not faulted for the crash, but rather his opinion that it was neither his nor the government's place to fix the current situation was the cause of so much public disapproval: "Economic depression cannot be cured by legislative action or executive pronouncement." (Pells), (Hoover). This infuriated and demoralized struggling Americans, who felt that the government and the President cared little for their problems. Sentiments towards the government did change with the policies and legislation of the next President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (New Deal).

By the late 1930's President, Franklin D. Roosevelt had taken positive steps to attempt to restore the US to its former state of prosperity with his ideas to re-employ and to better the lives of those most affected by the Depression. The President's first step to ending the Depression was

the Emergency Banking Act of 1933, which closed the banks until they could pass an inspection to prove that they were capable of making sound business decisions (New Deal). The closing of the banks allowed the banks to reorganize and evaluate how their business was being conducted and then allowed them to reopen once they were ready. One of Roosevelt's next steps was the Works Progress Administration of 1935, which employed 2.1 million workers over six years (Riggs). These workers were employed to build thousands of public buildings and bridges, including hundreds of airports, and over a half-million miles of roads (New Deal). This administration was able to both employ millions of workers, while at the same time building the infrastructure of modern America with roads, highways, and airports that still are used in present-day America. Roosevelt is also credited with the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1933, which built dams to provide electricity to Mid-Atlantic and Appalachian areas (O'Neil). This act helped to provide electricity to primarily impoverished areas of the country. As much as these important projects improved the day-to-day life of most Americans there was still general poverty from low wages.

One of the most important pieces of legislation and ideas for positive change was the Fair Labor Standards Act, which would set a minimum standard of living for all Americans. The bill was inspired by Roosevelt's Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins and drafted by Senator Hugo Black from Alabama (Grossman). The Fair Standards Labor Act of 1938 would establish a 40-hour workweek, a minimum wage of 40 cents an hour, while severely curbing labor for children under the age of 16 (FLSA). A powerful and unchecked five-man committee would also be established to control wage and hour standards in a given industry (Grossman). If an employee worked more than the 40-hour maximum, they must be paid 150% of their normal pay (FLSA). Previously, there had been attempts to create bills that each had parts of the Fair Labor Standard

Act in them, but they were all struck down by the Supreme Court in decisions in 1918, *Hammer v. Dagenhart*; 1923, *Adkins v. Children's Hospital*; and 1935, *Schechter Corp. v. the US*. The main reason the Supreme Court made these decisions was that they believed that these laws violated the rights of workers and employees' freedom to contract (Grossman). In response to the decision, Roosevelt threatened the Supreme Court, whom he called the “nine old men” with adding six new justices (Grossman). The anger the President felt stemmed from the Supreme Court's obstructive actions against his attempts to better the lives of the impoverished. As Roosevelt's relationship with the Supreme Court justices tensed over minimum wage and maximum work hour legislation, a majority of American families supported the bill claiming that people should be able to earn a living wage that they could support a family with (Luce). Families supported the bill because it would create a reliable wage with a guarantee of family time. However, it was very unpopular with small business and hospitality business owners who had small profit margins and would now be forced to pay their employees more (Luce). Yet, the bill still had an overwhelming amount of general support among the typical Americans, despite imperfections.

Unfortunately, for the Fair Labor Standard Act to survive Congress and the Supreme Court, the coverage of the bill had to be restricted so that fewer Americans would be covered. This meant that in the original document of the Fair Labor Standard Act only 20% of Americans would be under the bill's coverage (FLSA). The number had to be so small since previous pieces of state legislation that controlled minimum wage and maximum work hours in a week were struck down by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled five to four in a 1936 decision that broad minimum wage bills were unconstitutional under Contract of Liberty (Grossman). To circumvent the Court's rulings, the bill was written to only cover “employments in and affecting

interstate commerce,” (FLSA). This version of the bill was legal since the federal government had the power to control interstate businesses including trade (Grossman). The drawback to this maneuvering was that fewer than half of Americans were working in interstate commerce, rendering the bill widely ineffective. Some of the common jobs not included in the bill were farmers, fishermen, retail workers, meat packers, and executives/managers (FLSA). Railroad workers were also not covered since they had their maximum work hours in a week, overtime, and minimum wage guaranteed under the Adamson Act of 1916 (Controversies in American History). Child labor was also restricted slightly so that children would only be allowed to work on farms if they were legally allowed to miss school, or as actors in film or theater (FLSA). Despite these holes in coverage the bill was now legal in the eyes of the Supreme Court Justices and was ready for its next test: Congress.

In both houses of Congress, the bill faced heavy opposition from senators, who opposed the bill and attempted to block its passage in Congress, forcing the Fair Labor Standard Act to be revised and edited to be ratified. The original bill was delivered to both houses in Congress on May 24, 1937, where it received a mixed response from some Senators who called the bill an exercise of “tyrannical industrial dictatorship,” while others claimed that “it aims to establish by law a plane of competition,” (Grossman). Supporters of the bill argued that it would help the poor and the unemployed, by ending the dangerously cut-throat job market (Grossman). Opponents of the bill claimed that the government should not have the power to meddle in raising the living standard of the poorest workers and that the five-man committee had too much broad power (Roosevelt). Despite these concerns, the bill passed the Senate nine weeks later but was stopped from reaching the House floor by conservative representatives (Riggs). In late 1937, the bill was eventually put to the House floor where it was voted down (Grossman). Now the bill

needed to be revised. Revisions included adding a less powerful administrator instead of the five-man committee (Grossman). This change was made to compromise with the many representatives who disliked an unchecked committee with broad authority. Under the new plan, the administrator would create several less powerful committees for each industry to oversee the bill's enactment and to help determine minimum wage and maximum hours for each industry (Wall Street Journal). The administrator would have the final say, but the committees had the power to overrule the administrator's decision (Wall Street Journal). Another revision changed the minimum wage from 40 cents to 25 cents an hour, and maximum work hours in a week went from 40 hours to 44 hours (FLSA). With these new revisions the bill was passed by the House on June 13, 1938, was signed by Roosevelt on June 25, 1938, and went into effect on October 24, 1938 (Grossman).

One major flaw of the Fair Labor Standard Act was that it did not account for inflation when determining the minimum wage. Despite repeated efforts to raise the minimum wage, it has failed to keep up with the pace of inflation and the real cost of living. The initial minimum wage when the FLSA was enacted was 25 cents, which equates to \$4.19 in today's dollars (Kurtz). As time went on, the actual value of the minimum wage dropped, reaching its lowest point after only 11 years (Kurtz). This created a necessity for politicians to amend the bill to raise the minimum wage. There would be attempts to amend the bill between 1956 to 1997 (Opposing Viewpoints). Notable politicians, John F Kennedy and Barack Obama have tried to raise the minimum wage (Opposing Viewpoint), (Kennedy). Kennedy, then a senator, in 1959, successfully raised the minimum wage from \$1, up 25 cents, to \$1.25; President Barack Obama failed to do so during his two terms as President (Opposing Viewpoint), (Kennedy). Another President who endeavored to raise the minimum wage was Lyndon Baines Johnson, and he

successfully raised the minimum wage by 15 cents, to \$1.40 in 1967 (Chicago Tribune). Today fewer and fewer amendments have been made to raise the minimum wage federally, with politicians now raising the minimum wage at the state, and even city, level more often than before (Luce).

In the almost 80 years since the passing of the Fair Labor Standard Act into law, politicians have sought to extend coverage to include most American workers who were not originally protected by the act. The amendments have helped to protect people from low and unlivable wages. Three amendments to the Fair Labor Standard Act were made in 1961, 1966, 1974 to put more Americans under the protection of the bill (Luce). In the 1961 and 1974 amendments, coverage was extended to include workers in retail and public industries (Luce). The biggest amendments, however, came in the 1966 amendment which would extend the minimum wage and maximum work hours of the Fair Labor Standard Act to an extended number of industries, including hospital, laundry, farming, and school industries (Luce), (Bernstein). The change to the Fair Labor Standard Act put almost 34 million more people under the protection of the bill's \$1.30 minimum wage and a 40-hour maximum workweek (Bernstein), (Wall Street Journal). With all of these great amendments, there are still people unrepresented in coverage of the Fair Labor Standard Act including, college students, the disabled, and some workers who receive tips (Opposing Viewpoints). College students that are working in their area of study can make 75% of the minimum wage. Workers that receive tips during their work that exceed the minimum wage do not have to be paid the full minimum wage (Opposing Viewpoints). There still is a fight for more to be done with the Fair Labor Standard Act. In 2015, fast-food chain workers throughout America organized the largest walkout in United States history, with over 60,000 men and women participating in the walkout (Opposing Viewpoints). Even though many

improvements have been made to the Fair Labor Standards Act more work can be done to cover more people and raise the minimum wage nationally to help lift minimum wage workers out of poverty.

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was one of Roosevelt's most impactful and far-reaching pieces of legislation. During his presidency, Roosevelt was tasked with helping Americans who had lost everything get back on their feet again. Requiring employers to pay a minimum wage to employees allowed workers to have the money they need to support their families and to have wages to spend on essential needs. The FLSA benefited the economy as a whole as workers had money to spend and by establishing a 40-hour work week where families were guaranteed family time. These minimum standards are still an important baseline of employment today. The bill was not as perfect as many Americans wanted it to be when it was first passed. For it to pass Congress, and to survive the Supreme Court, the bill had to be watered down, and even then, the bill almost did not get ratified. Even though the bill did not reach its initial goals, it did create a base for future politicians to follow and build off of to create a wider-reaching and more effective legislation to benefit all American workers and the US economy.

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Section 4

Classics

“The Cyclical Nature of Ancestral Karma: A Juxtaposition of the Phidias’ Statues of Athena Parthenos in the Periclean Parthenon of Athens, and Zeus at The Temple of Zeus in Olympia”

Jessie R. Melvin

The tithes to our ancestral kin become inevitably present as humans discover that their actions are the building blocks of their creation. The obvious connection between Zeus and Athena is present as the two are canonically father and daughter in ancient Greek mythology. The physical manifestation of Athena and Zeus are depicted in their magnificence by the Athenian sculptor Phidias at the Temple of Zeus in Olympia, and at the Periclean Parthenon in Athens. The statue of Athena was initially presented to the Athenian citizens in 438 B.C.E. as the centerpiece of the naos of the Periclean Parthenon.¹³⁷ The temple is described to be the focal point of the city of Athens, as it luxuriously sits within the Acropolis walls. However grand and ambitious Phidias' work in Athens was, he set his sights on another magnificent project: that of the statue of Olympian Zeus. The statue of Zeus was depicted in the naos of the Temple of Zeus in Olympia and was completed in 435 B.C.E.¹³⁸ Both temples were placed in each city to be dedicated to their patron gods. The Athena Parthenos statue was dedicated to Athens, while the

¹³⁷ Laura Sammartino, “Phidias (Pheidias)” *Archaeologies of the Greek Past*, Joukowsky Institute for Archaeology at Brown University. Accessed May 5, 2020.

¹³⁸ Mark Cartwright, “Statue of Zeus at Olympia,” *Ancient History Encyclopedia*. Ancient History Encyclopedia, September 24, 2019.

statue of Zeus was dedicated to his temple at Olympia. The connectedness of these two sculptures becomes inherently apparent as Phidias' creations echo themes about the cyclical nature of power as the statues depict how humans are karmically affected by our ancestor's decisions.

According to ancient Greek myth, Zeus killed his father Kronos to usurp his ultimate control, and thus, Zeus became the King of the Gods.¹³⁹ Kronos ate his children out of fear that one of them would take his sovereignty. However morally insecure, Kronos' fears would prove to become reality as Zeus eventually did seize his father's title as King of the Titans. Coincidentally, Kronos ran into the same predicament with his father Uranus. Kronos eventually killed Uranus, just as Zeus subsequently killed his father. The cycle of fear of sovereignty being lost as a new usurper ultimately claims control is witnessed through the birth and death of Uranus, Kronos, and Zeus. As expected, Zeus possessed the same ancestral fears his father and grandfather were plagued with as he heard of the coming birth of his child with Metis. However, similar to his ancestors, Zeus' insecurity of losing control caused him to swallow Metis and Athena was thus born from Zeus' skull. The sculptor Phidias created both astounding statues of the Athena Parthenos in Athens and of Zeus at the Temple of Zeus in Olympia. As different as they may seem, these two figures are ultimately connected as both represent the cyclical fear of the loss of sovereignty.

Both the statues of Athena and Zeus were unfortunately removed from their original intended locations. Thus, this analysis relies on the description of Pausanias as he traveled through ancient Greece and recorded his findings. The Athena Parthenos stands tall around forty

¹³⁹ Aaron J. Atsma, "Kronos," *Kronos: Greek Titan God of Time, King of the Titans*. Theoi, 2017.

feet high, according to Pausanias.¹⁴⁰ The statue of Zeus sits on a throne and is also around forty feet tall.¹⁴¹ These differences in height allow the viewers to see Zeus, the one who waits, and Athena, the active approacher. Athena is standing tall, ready for action, such as Zeus feared a supplanter would be. However, the tides of his ancestor's past come to change as Zeus is comfortably seated on his throne, unconcerned about losing his sovereignty.¹⁴² Both statues amount around forty feet tall, but Athena is half of the size that the sitting Zeus is. This allows the greatness of Zeus to be depicted as superior to Athena through their different heights. Seeing that Zeus did not want his child to usurp his throne, as he had done to his father, the swallowing of Athena demonstrates how he is superior to her. The stance of Athena demonstrates the active nature of the feared usurper, while the sitting position of Zeus suggests a relaxed state. It is as if comparing the waiting crone and an upright warrior, two opposite ends of the same spectrum of life.

Both statues are luxuriously created with an ivory body adorned with gold. This same sense of divinity is connected as the family is made of the same materials, and is sculpturally seen as being created from the same entity, or the same genetic lineage as humans would describe it. Alongside these decadent materials used, the depictions of the two are seen to be decorated with different headdresses. Athena wears her helmet, as she represents the youthful

¹⁴⁰ Pausanias, *Pausanias: Description of Greece*, Edited by W. H. S. Jones et al., Harvard University Press, 1971. I. 24.5-7.

¹⁴¹ Pausanias, *Pausanias: Description of Greece*, Edited by W. H. S. Jones et al., Harvard University Press, 1971. V.11. 9.

¹⁴² *Ibid*, 9.

warrior ready for battle,¹⁴³ while Zeus is merely wearing a garland decorated with olives.¹⁴⁴

Fascinatingly, the helmet of Athena Parthenos is covered with a sphinx in the middle. The sphinx represents wisdom, which ultimately makes sense as to why it is upon Athena's head, as she is the goddess of wisdom.¹⁴⁵ However, as Pausanias describes, the sphinx is protected by two griffins on her helmet. The griffin is a creature created from the body of a lion and combined with the wings and beak of an eagle. In contrast, the helmet of Athena, and the garland worn by Zeus represent one another. The laurel is the tree Athena gifts to the city of Athens, but her symbol is seen upon Zeus' head, representing his connection to her, and the wisdom bestowed upon his head as supreme leader of the gods. Athena's head is covered with the wise sphinx while the griffins surrounding the sphinx protect her. As the griffin is ultimately a combination of an eagle and a lion this symbol is overwhelmingly connected to Zeus, as the animal that represents him is the eagle. Absorbingly, these headpieces demonstrate how Athena and Zeus wear the symbols of each other upon their heads. This represents how the pair are ancestrally connected in the cycle of fear of one's own offspring's potential power. In a way, this fear of oneself, or self-undoing, connects these two principles as each child murders their fathers in the tale of this genetic lineage.

However illusively connected the family of the Olympian gods proves to be, Pausanias describes that within the hands of these two sculptures there are different objects. The Athena Parthenos statue grasps a miniature figure of Nike herself, while she grasps a spear in the

¹⁴³ Pausanias, *Pausanias: Description of Greece*, Edited by W. H. S. Jones et al., Harvard University Press, 1971. I. 24.5.

¹⁴⁴ Pausanias, *Pausanias: Description of Greece*, Edited by W. H. S. Jones et al., Harvard University Press, 1971. V.11. 8.

¹⁴⁵ Guruji Ma, "The Great Sphinx, Part I: Meaning and Message," Light Omega. Light Omega, n.d. Accessed May 1, 2020.

opposite hand.¹⁴⁶ Similarly, Zeus' hand is also filled with a statue of Nike, representing victory. The representation of Nike depicts a victory of some sort and seeing that both statues hold a figure of Nike shows how both are victorious.¹⁴⁷ This is further depicted with the placement of the miniature Nike statue in the palm of Zeus' hand, denoting that he controls her. This victory in itself is that Athena did not take Zeus' sovereignty as he so feared, and the ancestrally karmic attitudes of distrust and supposed betrayal were avoided. Zeus was able to remain sovereign, and Athena did not have to face the eventual sense of victory over her father that would result in her insecurity with her potential offspring. It is necessary to examine the concept that Athena's state of constant virginity is connected with her inability to reproduce an offspring that would eventually usurp her power. This contrasts with the importance of having children in ancient Greek culture, similar to how Athena contrasts with the general role of a typical feminine child-bearing woman in ancient Greece. Alongside these contrasts, it is important to note how Zeus is consumed with sexual desire, while the virgin Athena is the opposite. This evolutionary perspective is connected with the ancient Greek ideal and theme of fear and love of one's own creation. Often in life, the deepest sense of longing is also connected to a sense of fear for its loss. This is seen as the cycle of desiring ultimate power while fearing the loss of it, is exerted by Zeus, Athena, Kronos, and Uranus.

Alongside the theme of love and fear comes the recollection of the other items that were located in Athena Parthenos' and Olympian Zeus' hands. While both figures hold statues of

¹⁴⁶ Pausanias. *Pausanias: Description of Greece*, Edited by W. H. S. Jones et al., Harvard University Press, 1971. I. 24. 7.

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Nike, representing victory over karmic ancestral ties, Athena holds a spear in her other hand.¹⁴⁸ This image of Athena as the warrior is once again seen as her spear in hand demonstrates her nature, like her father's, to be called to action and attack. However, unlike Zeus, Athena is grounded by wisdom; her head is adorned with the Sphinx for a reason. Zeus' other sculptural hand grasps a scepter with an eagle atop it.¹⁴⁹ The obtainment of this scepter represents Zeus' current possession of power as the eagle, his symbol, sits on top of the scepter. Through these contrasting symbols of Athena as the image of the warrior, and Zeus as the monarch contrastingly show reflections of each other's pasts. Zeus can see his younger self in Athena as both possess the Nike statue of victory, but Athena is now the child with the power to usurp her father, as Zeus once was also a threat to Kronos.

As the natural cyclical nature of power is examined it is also relevant to discuss the outfits that these two figures are wearing, as they further depict their personalities. The Athena Parthenos statue wears a tunic that reaches the ground, her helmet, and an ivory version of the head of Medusa around her neck.¹⁵⁰ Pausanias also describes that Zeus wears a golden robe covered with animals and lilies.¹⁵¹ Zeus' clothing is of a much more relaxed nature, whereas Athena's warrior attire, and the head of Medusa worn on her neck, demonstrate her active nature. Zeus' robe represents comfort, which is understandable seeing that he is no longer in fear that his

¹⁴⁸ Pausanias, *Pausanias: Description of Greece*, Edited by W. H. S. Jones et al., Harvard University Press, 1971. I. 24. 5.

¹⁴⁹ Pausanias, *Pausanias: Description of Greece*, Edited by W. H. S. Jones et al., Harvard University Press, 1971. V.11. 8.

¹⁵⁰ Pausanias, *Pausanias: Description of Greece*, Edited by W. H. S. Jones et al., Harvard University Press, 1971. I. 24. 6.

¹⁵¹ Pausanias, *Pausanias: Description of Greece*, Edited by W. H. S. Jones et al., Harvard University Press, 1971. V.11. 8.

offspring will commandeer his power. Fascinatingly, the symbol of the lily is one connected to motherhood and childbearing, which is a symbol undeniably applicable to Zeus' life as he is infatuated with women.¹⁵² Whereas Athena does not have sexuality, Zeus is the epitome of the lustful man. Zeus wears the lilies that represent childbearing, and he ironically bore Athena in his own body. This further annotates the statues' connection to Athena. The karmic cycle of taking sovereignty from one's father was avoided as, unlike Kronos and Uranus, Zeus protects his daughter, instead of desiring ill will for her. The relationship of Zeus and Athena demonstrates how if one nurtures their children, instead of viewing them as a threat to sovereignty, one may achieve balance and defeat the ancestral karma projected onto multiple generations. Zeus had to defy the masculine nature of his child, Athena, to achieve a sense of peace.

Interestingly enough, the nature of Zeus and Athena are seen to be of the same making, while they are simultaneously opposite in sexual nature. Sexuality is an inevitable part of existence for most, but Zeus and Athena represent two extremes examined throughout time: the virgin versus the sexually promiscuous. As seen in Pausanias' description of Athena Parthenos the maiden is covered with the head of Medusa, which is known for its fearful ability to turn men into stone.¹⁵³ This is only appropriately worn on the neck of Athena as she propels all that sexually lust after her. This is a theme that follows suit to the nature of her mother Metis, the goddess of prudence. Contrastingly, her father Zeus is known for his extravagant affairs and zest for life, while both Athena and Zeus are known for their nature as powerful warriors. The statue of Zeus at Olympia sits upon a throne decorated with four of the Victories, and three of the

¹⁵² Kevin Kegan, "The History of the Lily: The Pure Flower," Blossom Flowers, January 29, 2018.

¹⁵³ Pausanias, *Pausanias: Description of Greece*, Edited by W. H. S. Jones et al., Harvard University Press, 1971. I. 24. 7.

Seasons are depicted.¹⁵⁴ His chair consists entirely of women, while Athena has no chair, just as she has no apparent sign of sexuality. Zeus is surrounded by the beauty of females he loves as he comfortably sits upon his chair. Once Zeus won his power to rule from Kronos, his ultimate ambitions became sexual. His need to chase women allowed Zeus to feel the sense of passion felt while at war that he had lost with age. Athena harbors no apparent sexual desire, while she has taken the position of Zeus to be the able warrior, as she is the protector of Athens. In contrast, Athena has no throne, and no desire to express herself sexually because she is entirely fixated on her status as the warrior. These two statues depict the embodiment of the conundrum of choosing between love and work, passion and pleasure, versus logic and accomplishment, a theme present throughout human existence. However, the control exerted by Zeus supplies a sense of unity between the pair. Zeus bore Athena from his own body and so, Athena and Zeus represent the cataclysmic duality of prudence and desire. While both are seen as opposites, the pair can be seen as a united force of ultimate power at the same time: Zeus being sexual desire, and Athena being tactical power.

The importance of sexuality is further witnessed in the description of Zeus' throne. The throne of Zeus is covered with different women, while the statue of Athena stands upon a base with a contradictory feeling. As Athena Parthenos stands, she presides over a base that Pausanias describes to be the birth of Pandora, the first woman.¹⁵⁵ Although Pandora was the first woman, her general status is acknowledged as the bringer of evil as she opened a box that released all vices upon the earth. While hope remained in Pandora's box, her ultimate description as a

¹⁵⁴ Pausanias, *Pausanias: Description of Greece*, Edited by W. H. S. Jones et al., Harvard University Press, 1971. V.11. 8.

¹⁵⁵ Pausanias, *Pausanias: Description of Greece*, Edited by W. H. S. Jones et al., Harvard University Press, 1971. I. 24. 7.

beautiful, yet shamefully evil woman, is described. The depiction of the birth of Pandora is a contrasting image of the feminine nature depicted on the throne of Zeus in the Temple of Zeus at Olympia. These two figures sculpturally and embody the contrasting stereotypical views of women throughout time: the virgin and the sexually expressive female. Zeus demonstrates the feminine seasons, four positive Victories, and three of the graces shown as female. While Zeus' throne glorifies the sexual and beautiful nature of the feminine creation, the sculpture of the Athena Parthenos demonstrates rigid femininity. The base picture of Pandora's birth represented is opposite to the symbol of Athena, as Athena is a symbol of logic and frigidity. Her desires are so deeply controlled because of how logical she is, and this is how Zeus raised her to be. When Zeus devoured Athena's mother, Metis, he did so out of fear of what offspring would arise from their relationship. Athena did not develop in the womb of her mother as Kronos and Zeus did but instead was created with her father's mind. Seeing that Zeus bore Athena, it comes as no surprise to comprehend that Athena is the perfect child that Zeus knows he will never have to fear.

Through the studying of Phidias' two sculptures of the Athena Parthenos in Athens, and the statue of Zeus at the Temple of Zeus in Olympia are ultimately connected in familial and material design. Although both statues reside at different locations it is demonstrated through analysis that the karmic fear of Zeus, that Athena will corrupt his sovereignty, is present. On a larger scale, this relationship echoes the ultimate fear of loss of power once it is achieved that is present within the minds of all humans. Zeus is depicted as the ultimate monarch with supreme sovereignty here, while Athena is depicted as the warrior. Both seem to contrast each other in intention and sexuality; however, this falsity allows for the duality of human nature to be examined. As Uranus, Kronos, Zeus, and Athena experienced, often human fears are mirrored images of the corruption or loss of passions as they are experienced. Zeus is obsessed with the

passion that arises from consummating liaisons, as Athena is deeply devoted to her status as a warrior. Both demonstrate opposite outlets fueled by inner passion: sex and work. Similarly, Greek mythology demonstrates how our mistakes and fears ancestral nature as fears karmically bonded from the formation of our ancestor's actions. Ancient Greek mythology never ceases to provide the world with a glimpse into the imminent nature of mankind. As the past becomes irrelevant to some, it is witnessed that these recurring themes of human nature tithe people to their ancestors. Willingly or unwillingly so, ancestor's impressions upon the world decide their offspring's fate and the fate of future generations. As human genetic lineages spread with the growth of time the mortal flesh decays, but past interpretations of reality remain present upon the consciousness of future generations forever.

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